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Abstract 
Italy’s overall GDP growth has been dismal in recent years and this poor performance has been 
compounded by a declining trend in labour productivity and total factor productivity growth. This 
paper looks into growth accounting and structural indicators and analyses Italy’s performance 
against other European countries. We look at the evidence provided by newly available 
information from the Lisbon Assessment Framework (LAF) developed by the Working Group on 
Lisbon Methodology (LIME) attached to the Economic Policy Committee and the European 
Commission services (DG ECFIN). Building upon the results of existing literature, we 
investigate whether this new evidence is supported by data from other sources and provides 
fresh insight into Italy’s reform process. The main message from the analysis of growth 
accounting and structural indicators appears to be that Italy’s GDP growth significantly 
underperformed that of the EU15 in 2001-2007 notwithstanding progress on reforms.        
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Since the mid-1990s, the Italian economy has recorded a significant slowdown in its growth rate. 
While the same trend has been observed in most other European countries, Italy’s performance has 
been comparatively weaker. In 2001-2007, the GDP growth gap versus the EU15
1 average was almost 
one percentage point a year (2.0% as against 1.1%).  
Structural factors, such as persistent rigidities in the labour market and a low degree of 
competition in product markets, have played a major role in causing Italy's disappointing performance.  
  This paper identifies the factors which had a negative impact on Italy’s performance in 2001-2007 
by looking at growth accounting and structural indicators. Structural weaknesses are to be considered 
critical areas for policy making, i.e. areas where reforms are most needed and also potentially most 
beneficial.  
  The approach we use is based on the screening methodology which has been developed by the 
LIME Working Group on Lisbon Methodology (LIME), attached to the Economic Policy Committee, and 
European Commission services (DG ECFIN). The methodology, called LAF (Lisbon Assessment 
Framework), provides a transparent and simple framework which helps shaping a policy debate on 
many aspects of the Lisbon reform process. It ensures consistency across countries based on 
structural indicators with literature links to growth components and policies. In our paper, LIME data are 
complemented by EU KLEMS and national source data and information. 
First, the analysis identifies the GDP components which negatively contributed to growth, either 
in absolute terms or in comparison to the EU15 average. The analysis focuses on the medium- to long-
term dynamics of economic growth, and investigates the relevant variables on the supply side. 
Developments in labour and capital stock – through an increase in employment and investment – and 
progress in technology and work organisation – which bring changes in total factor productivity – are 
the GDP growth determinants. Then the analysis cross-checks growth accounting results with those 
structural indicators that have shown in the literature a link to relevant GDP growth components.  
 
2  BREAKDOWN OF GDP GROWTH AND LEVELS 
This section identifies components of GDP growth where Italy underperformed relative to the 
EU15 average and assesses the underperformance gap. Growth accounting results in GDP level and 
changes are summarised in Figure 1 and Table 1 (LAF scores). 
 
                                                       
1 The EU15 countries are: Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Finland, Portugal, Austria, Greece, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Sweden, Denmark, and the United Kingdom.   
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Figure 1.  An overview of income and growth differentials and sources 
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Source: AMECO, with data mostly sourced from ISTAT (Italian Statistical Office).  
Note: The left-hand panel shows the gap in per-capita GDP versus EU15 in 2007 and its decomposition into individual 
components: a demographic component, a labour market specific component and hourly labour productivity. Each of these 
components is further decomposed into subcomponents. The horizontal axis shows the gap in percentage points versus EU15 
levels. The middle panel depicts the decomposition of absolute GDP growth into its (sub) components between 2001 and 2007. 
The horizontal axis shows percentage point contributions to absolute growth. The right-hand panel also provides decomposition 
of GDP growth, although this time relative to EU15. The horizontal axis thus shows by how many percentage points each (sub) 
component contributed more/less to growth than the EU15. ‘Initial education (labour quality)’ measures the average productivity 
per person employed relative to the productivity of the low skilled, proxied by those with lower secondary education or less (it is 
usually incorporated in total factor productivity, i.e. Solow’s residual). 
 
As shown in Figure 1 and Table 1, Italy’s economic performance was weak. Both the growth 
rate and final per-capita level of GDP were below the EU15 average. In 2001-2007, Italy’s GDP moved 
gradually away from the EU15 benchmark, with average annual growth almost one percentage point 
lower, resulting in a wider gap in level to approximately 9 percentage points in 2007.  
Italy’s unfavourable performance is mainly caused by poor productivity both in growth and level 
terms differentials. This in turn is largely due to a sizeable underperformance in total factor productivity 
(TFP) and, to a lesser extent, a smaller progress in capital deepening in terms of change from 2001 to 
2007. In terms of 2007 levels, it is also due to labour quality. While TFP made a positive contribution to 
growth in the EU15, it did not in Italy. Italy’s TFP recorded a contraction over the seven-year period 
under consideration (a 0.5% drag per year).  
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Table 1:   Relative performance of GDP components vis-à-vis the EU15  




Demographic component  -8  -4  0.2 
  Fertility / Native Population   -9  -10  -0.1 
  Share of foreign population / Net Migration   -8  6  0.7 
  Share of Working age Population  -5  -10  -0.3 
Labour market component   6  11  0.8 
  Youth Participation   -14  -20  -0.5 
  25-54 Male Participation  -15  9  0.0 
  25-54 Female Participation  -20  11  0.5 
  55-64 Participation   -15  2  0.5 
  Unemployment Rate  5  18  0.6 
  Average Hours Worked  13  -2  -0.3 
Labour productivity  -9  -17  0.1 
  Capital Deepening   -6  -11  0.3 
  Total Factor Productivity  -6  -15  -0.5 
  Labour quality (Initial education of labour force)  -17  2  0.3 
GDP per capita (level) / GDP (growth)  -8  -10  1.1 
 
Note: This table summarises data contained in the right-hand and left-hand panels of Figure 1 and provides information on the 
relative importance of individual growth (sub) components. The scores are computed as follows: score = 10 * (component - 
EU15 average)/ EU15 standard deviation. The score is trimmed at -30 and +30 (+/- 3 standard deviation) to avoid getting the 
picture distorted by outliers.  
 
Capital deepening increased at a slower pace than the EU15 average, and it was below the 
EU15 average level in 2007. In 2001-2007, it decelerated as labour became cheaper relative to capital 
and more flexible as a factor of production. Labour quality, as measured by the initial educational 
attainment of the workforce, caught up slightly over the seven-year period, but it was still lagging well 
behind the EU15 average level in 2007.  
As for labour utilisation, Italy outperformed the EU15 in terms of increase in labour market 
participation and reduction in the unemployment rate, although this progress was partly offset by the 
contraction in average hours worked per person employed. More specifically, progress in participation 
was greater than for the EU15 average for prime-age workers (males and females), also thanks to 
migrant workers who entered the labour market, whereas older workers' participation increased only 
slightly more than the EU average. By contrast, Italy moved further away from the EU average in 
terms of youth participation.  
Demographic developments
2 are less favourable for growth in Italy than in the EU15, given the 
size of the contraction in the share of the working-age and native population, only partly offset by net 
migration. This represents a major challenge for the future. 
                                                       
2 Strictly speaking, Fertility and Net migration are not a component of per capita GDP (total population is a component of GDP 
but not of per capita GDP). LAF takes the growth decomposition of GDP and to also show the performance of variables 
capturing the ‘level’ of each growth component. In most cases, these variables in level correspond to the breakdown of per 
capita GDP, but not for Fertility and Net migration. The idea is to jointly interpret variables in level and growth, as the 
interpretation of the score in growth differs if the level is initially very high or, conversely, very low but subject to a ‘catch-up 
effect’. The fertility rate is instead a useful stock variable for assessing the starting conditions of the increase in native population 
(flow variable). It is much better than the size of population which makes no sense in a benchmarking perspective, where small 
countries would always be the worst performers. The fertility rate also complements the share of working-age population, as the 
former gives information on future population trends as opposed to the latter, which is the result of past trends. Net migration as 
a share of total population is a useful stock variable for assessing the starting conditions of net migration flows.  
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Italy’s performance was strongly influenced by sizeable regional differences. In 2006
3 the 
Central and Northern macro region had a higher level of per-capita GDP than the EU15 average, while 
in the South this level was only around 60% of the EU15 average. The North-South divide has always 
been wide in the past. Italy’s regions are among the most- and least-developed European regions. In 
2001-2006, the difference in per-capita GDP growth vis-à-vis EU15 was more pronounced in the 
Centre North mainly due to demographic components. Italy’s productivity was also significantly 
affected by the regional divide. The gap in labour productivity levels is much lower in Central and 
Northern Italy than in the South. Differences in terms of growth were negative in both areas. In 2007, 
Italy’s outperformance in labour market participation was mainly the result of performance in Central 
and Northern Italy, whose employment rate was higher than the EU15 average. Nevertheless, growth 
in employment was stronger in the South
4.  
3  THE PRODUCTIVITY GAP 
As explained above, Italy’s underperformance in GDP growth relative to the EU15 average in 
2001-2007 (-0.9 percentage point) can entirely be attributed to gap in labour productivity. Labour 
productivity contributed only 0.1 percentage points in absolute terms and the differential with the EU15 
was 1.1. This is almost completely explained by the growth gap in total factor productivity (-1.0pp), 
which measures a set of factors such as technological progress, factors organisation in the production 
process, market regulation, etc.. By contrast, the contribution of labour was positive relative to the 
EU15 (0.5pp). Within the labour factor, labour participation performed in line with the EU15 due to 
sizeable improvements also in other countries, while in absolute terms it accounted for almost half 
(0.5pp) of the annual GDP growth in 2001-2007 (1.1%). Besides, the contribution of (i.e. the decrease 
in) unemployment was substantial (0.5pp; 0.6pp in absolute terms), while that of average hours 
worked was marginally negative (0.0pp; -0.3pp in absolute terms). As for demographic components, 
the contribution of the working-age population was negative (-0.2pp; -0.3pp in absolute terms), while 
there was a strong migration contribution (0.2pp; 0.7pp in absolute terms).  
 
The above results should be viewed in the context of Italy’s economic changes over the same years. 
First, the decline in both total factor productivity and the number of hours worked partly reflects 
positive developments in the labour market. The extensive use of part-time and – to a lesser extent – 
temporary work caused a reduction in the number of hours worked per worker. Greater flexibility 
achieved in the labour market, following the introduction of new types of employment contracts, 
allowed a net decrease in unemployment as a result of more workers being hired. However, low-skill 
jobs accounted for the lion’s share of employment gains and the productivity of the marginal worker 
tends to be lower than that of the average worker. This may have partly contributed to depress total 
factor productivity growth. Reduced growth in productivity may indeed be a side effect of sweeping 
reforms in the labour market, with an employment-productivity trade-off emerging over time. Moreover, 
regularisation of illegal immigrant work (due for instance to Law 189/2002, the so-called Bossi-Fini 
                                                       
3 2006 is the latest figure that is currently available. 
4 ‘Quadro strategico nazionale per la politica regionale di sviluppo 2007-2013’ and ‘Documento Strategico Preliminare 
Nazionale. Continuità, discontinuità, priorità per la politica regionale 2007-2013’, Ministry of Economic Development.  
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Law), may have contributed to bringing to light irregular employment which had not previously been 
included in estimates, and have therefore contributed to depress productivity growth. A significant 
correlation can be observed between employment increase and productivity decrease since 1997. 
This suggests that the decrease in total factor productivity up to 2005 may have partly been explained 
by a surge in labour utilisation which may well be a transient phenomenon. For instance, the sharp 
increases in ‘atypical’ employment and the sizeable regularisation of immigrant workers are unlikely to 
repeat themselves in the future. In fact, the trend decline in hours worked slowed substantially in 2006 
already. The explanation of the possible causes underlying the productivity decline can be also found 
in Robert Gordon and Ian Dew-Becker (2008) and Bandiera, Guiso, Prat and Sadun (2008). In the first 
paper authors show the way some of the policy reforms implemented in Europe may raise 
employment per capita but also reduce productivity in the short run. Their idea is that if labour demand 
does not shift when labour market reform occurs, then labour supply shifts to the right along a given 
labour demand curve so productivity declines as a result. This could have been the case in Italy as 
well following the changes in labour market legislation in favour of more flexibility. Instead, in the long 
run, employment rises as well as policy reforms may enhance investments; in particular, promoting 
liberalisation and encouraging competition should give large long-run benefits. In the second paper the 
authors suggest that Italy’s disappointing productivity growth may also depend on the way most of 
Italian firms select and develop managerial talent, that is on the base of a fidelity model instead of a 
performance one; in fact those models provide significantly different outcomes in terms of quality and 
performance of both the manager and the firm itself. 
 
Growth accounting shows the existence of a gap in the level of ‘quality of labour’. Quality of 
labour is estimated by using the proxy of the initial level of education of the work force. To some extent, 
the low result according to this metric is associated with Italy's specialisation in low- and medium-
technology products, even though specific policy actions may also play a role. In terms of level, the 
quality of labour is substantially below most other European countries despite some progress in recent 
years. For instance, the number of university graduates rose between 2001 and 2007 (their number 
almost doubled since 1999, although the result is probably affected by recent changes in Italy’s 
university system), while school drop-out rates fell. Nevertheless, the overall negative gap with the 
EU15 improved only marginally. Despite moderate progress, structural indicators are negative across 
the board for the policy areas that intend to address this underperformance (see next chapter). 
Negative indicators include those that cover investment in physical and human capital in high-
technology sectors (R&D spending, number of researchers and patents) and those related to the 
vocational training of workers. According to the OECD’s PISA surveys, the quality of Italy's education 
system is below that of most industrialised countries. 
 
The decrease in total factor productivity in absolute terms is the most difficult component to 
analyse, due both to the economic significance of this variable (which incorporates aspects of 
technological progress and the organisation of production) and the existence of a vast set of 
microeconomic policies that can influence the behaviour of this component. Over and above the direct 
impact, some policies are crucial in shaping the economic environment in which businesses operate. 
Some pro-business policies are not sufficiently developed in Italy relative to Europe, but a word of 
caution is needed. Apparently a case in point is telecommunications and energy prices, which are on 
average much higher in Italy than in Europe. However, policies that favour competition do not show 
negative values. Higher prices are explained by specific factors. For instance, telecommunications 
prices do not include the price of telephone calls when roaming charges apply and the higher price of  
   
 
10 
energy is mostly the result of higher production costs. This highlights that any policy or performance 
indicator needs to be complemented by specific qualitative analysis. It is also worth mentioning that 
sectoral indicators related to promoting competition do not currently cover some very important sectors 
(e.g. retailing).  
The business environment and the establishment of companies remain a critical area despite 
past reform efforts. Italy’s gap versus the EU15 average relates mostly to legal and administrative 
procedures for the day-to-day running of business activity (the time required to register property, 
obtain a license and enforce a contract) and the starting or closing of businesses. As for prospects for 
international trade and international investment, Italy's market integration is still impeded, mostly by 
the large amount of time and high costs associated with customs transactions.  
The decline in total factor productivity may be attributed to negative sector-based dynamics. 
However, a more detailed sector-based approach (Daveri, Jona Lasinio, 2005) shows that the decline 
in productivity is broad-based. Besides, the re-composition of employment from sectors with higher 
productivity (typically manufacturing) to sectors with lower productivity (typically services) is not large 
enough to justify a sizeable impact for the whole economy. 
  
The contribution of capital to growth remained stable in 2001-2007 compared to previous years, 
although there was a net decrease with respect to the early 1990s. Nevertheless, the decrease in the 
relative cost of labour accounted for only some moderation in the accumulation of capital, whereas the 
relative intensity of capital compared to labour continued to grow. The fact that investment flows have 
continued to grow despite economic stagnation and the decrease in the relative cost of labour can be 
explained by higher profitability of capital relative to labour, especially in the services sector (Torrini, 
2005). However, contrary to other European countries, the positive contribution of both employment 
and capital deepening was accompanied by an abrupt decline in total factor productivity.  
4  PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT IN EACH POLICY AREA  
This section presents the main findings on Italy's relative performance with respect to 
quantitative policy indicators. Table 2 presents the aggregate continuous score for each policy area 
(labour market, product and capital market regulations, innovation and knowledge, and the macro 
economy) in terms of the current position (level) and progress (growth rate) relative to the EU15 
average. In the Annex there are detailed tables with policy and performance indicators for each policy 
area. The overall score for each area is based only on a narrow list of indicators as other indicators 
are either perceived as not being sufficiently reliable or there are specific problems with the series. 
The broader list is nevertheless useful in drawing an overall assessment of the policy area.  
 
4.1  LABOUR MARKET  
Starting with the labour market, the reforms introduced in Italy in the second half of the 1990s 
seem to have been effective in aligning Italy’s labour market conditions with those prevailing in the  
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EU15. Most policy indicators are close to zero, with a few slightly negative and one positive. Negative 
indicators refer to specific labour supply measures for older workers and women, market 
segmentation/dualisation and excessive job protection, and the insufficient scope of active labour 
market policies. Active labour market policies improved markedly in 2001-2007, even though they still 
lagged behind the EU15 in terms of 2007 level. There was some improvement in the field of wage 
bargaining and wage-setting policies and labour taxation, along with a marginal relative progress in 
the area of increasing working time. By contrast, three policy areas suffered relative deterioration vis-
à-vis the EU15: making-work-pay policies, job protection and labour market segmentation/dualisation 
and immigration and integration policies and labour mobility policies.  
 







Number of  
indicators in  
the narrow 
list         
Policy areas – Aggregate scores for   IT  Level Change Level Change    
Labour market               
Active labour market policies**  -3 10 3  0  6 
Making work-pay: interplay of tax and benefit system***  0 -5 2  7  10 
Labour taxation to stimulate labour demand ***  -4 8 1  0  4 
Job protection and labour market segmentation/dualisation**  -5 -3 3  3  5 
Policies increasing working time***  13 3  0  1  3 
Specific labour supply measures for women***  -3 -1 7  4  12 
Specific labour supply measures for older workers***  -5 2 6  4  8 
Wage bargaining and wage-setting policies**  0 6 1 0  4 
Immigration and integration policies***  -2 -7 3  3  6 
Labour market mismatch and labour mobility**  -6 2 2  1  4 
                
Product and capital market regulations               
Competition policy framework*  -1 1 1  0  5 
Sector specific regulation (telecoms, energy)**  -2 3 4  4  10 
Market integration - Openness to trade and investment**  -2 2 2  1  5 
Business environment, Regulatory barriers to entrepreneurship**  -8 3 5  2  8 
Business Dynamics – Start-up conditions***  -11 -5  3  2  4 
Financial markets and access to finance**  -4 0 8  0  20 
                
Innovation and knowledge               
R&D and Innovation***  -8 9 3  0  4 
ICT**  -1 1 2  1  5 
Education and life-long learning***  -8 2 9  2  11 
                
Macroeconomy               
Orientation and sustainability of public finances ***  -4 -1 2  0  6 
 
Note: For each policy area the overall quality of coverage by narrow list indicators is signalled: *** stands for broad coverage, ** 
medium coverage and * narrow coverage.    
This table presents the aggregate continuous score for each policy area, which is a weighted average of the values of the 
indicators in the narrow list. The scores for individual indicators are computed as follows: score = 10 * (indicator-
EU15average)/standard deviation EU15. The results indicate the levels for the latest available year and progress made 
(change). Consequently, a score of 10 means that the value of the indicators is 1 standard deviation above EU-15 average. The 
policy area is considered as underperforming if the aggregate score is below -4. The table also shows the number of 
underperforming indicators (their scores are less than -4) in the narrow list (both in terms of level and growth) as well the total 
number of indicators in the narrow list.  




Active Labour Market Policies (ALMP) refer to all initiatives aimed at encouraging and 
supporting employment, such as job placement services and job agencies, workers and unemployed 
continuing education, policies for young workers and in general all public expenditure assigned to an 
‘active’ support of labour (i.e. ‘active’ expenditure, as opposed to ‘passive expenditure’, such as 
unemployment benefits). Active labour market policies aim at increasing employment and reducing 
unemployment through continuing education and training for unemployed workers, the reduction of 
recruitment costs for firms, and a more efficient supply and demand matching process. ALMP policies 
are more effective if they are supported by policies to attract workforce, and by ‘making-work-pay’ 
policies, i.e. state incentives and tax concessions in favour of employment.  
Making job search and employment more profitable than unemployment benefits also requires 
modernisation in direct taxation and the social security contributions system. These policies impact 
both labour supply (choice between work and leisure) and demand (tax and social costs reduction). 
Policies affect the participation rate, education choices, choice between work and retirement, and cost-
benefits analyses of unemployment. In particular, taxes and unemployment benefits inevitably create a 
disincentive to work, by reducing labour supply, in terms of participation as well as hours worked (in 
particular for low-level professional careers with lower expectations). In general taxes create a 
difference between gross wages, and their effective purchasing power. They increase labour cost 
(especially social security contributions), thereby causing a decline in demand, whereas direct taxation 
of wages reduces net income and affects the choice between the marginal utility of labour and leisure. 
The final impact of taxation depends on whether firms can pass these additional costs on to wages. If 
additional costs are partly or totally passed on, wages are reduced, and labour supply consequently 
diminishes. By contrast, if these costs are not passed on to wages, they are borne by firms, and there 
is a consequent reduction in labour demand. In both cases though, high taxation tends to favour 
informal work. Finally, inadequate taxation also influences employed workers, causing a decline in the 
annual number of worked hours. 
According to LAF, Italy made substantial progress in ALMP in 2001-2007, with indicators being 
one standard deviation above the EU average. In terms of levels, Italy remains slightly below the EU15 
average. The positive growth performance was mainly due to performance rather than policy 
indicators, and especially youth and long-term unemployment. The improvement in youth 
unemployment may be ambiguous to interpret as it is linked to a poor growth accounting performance 
in youth participation and may have been affected by changes in the university system (the 
introduction of a two-tier system of university degrees). The sharp improvement in long-term 
unemployment is instead unambiguously positive. A number of other indicators not included in the 
short list show a negative performance in terms of level relative to the EU15, especially policy 
indicators related to expenditure as a percentage of GDP and per person wanting to work, and the 
number of participants in LMP. The proportion of the unemployed in education and training and that of 
the inactive in education and training are also below the EU15 average. This suggests insufficient 
spending and policy effort in training, although it also raises the issue of the efficiency and 
effectiveness of ALMP expenditure. The overall score may thus be considered overstated as it is 
unduly affected by those indicators that are included in the narrow list.  
Moving to making work-pay, policy indicators show a poor growth performance related to the 
unemployment and inactivity traps both for single persons and couples, while in level terms the 
message that comes from the unemployment trap is mixed and that for the inactivity trap  
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unambiguously positive. Performance indicators are mixed. Overall, and taking into account indicators 
that are not included in the narrow list, the situation is broadly in line with the EU15 average.  
Labour taxation to stimulate labour demand show a positive growth performance, mainly due to 
the reduction in the tax wedge on labour.         
Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) plays an important role in delivering efficiency and 
flexibility to firms. Regulatory rigidity risks preventing firms from adapting to changing market 
conditions, on the other hand employment law is nevertheless desirable. Fighting against labour 
market segmentation, while seeking greater business efficiency, is a prerequisite for bridging Italy’s 
efficiency and productivity gap, and a strong incentive to employment and continuing education. 
Working time organisation can also have relevant effects on key growth factors, such as labour 
flexibility and the number of hours worked. Average hours worked have declined steadily over the past 
15 years, which has caused a reduction in labour input relative to capital. This decline is partially 
explained by the emerging of flexible working arrangements, such as part-time work. However, hours 
worked and workers are not perfectly fungible due to the difference between fixed and variable costs. 
As opposed to variable costs, a reduction in fixed costs gives firms an incentive to substitute hours 
worked for workers. As a consequence, demand for workers and demand for hours worked often 
diverge. A decline in hours worked thus has an ambiguous effect: if the optimal number is equal to the 
contractual number of hours worked, a decrease in the latter would result in a reduction in the former. 
However, if the optimal number of hours worked is greater than the contractual number, a reduction in 
the latter will result in an increase in overtime work as variable costs decline relative to unchanged 
fixed costs. Eventually, working time is strictly related to labour organisation flexibility: modifying 
working time is a key element for labour organisation in order to adapt and secure benefits from 
technological progress (many studies have shown that ICT investment generates productivity growth 
only if it is accompanied by industrial restructuring). How does Italy score in job protection and labour 
market segmentation/dualisation and policies increasing working time? In the former area the level 
and change scores are slightly negative relative to the EU15, while in the latter they are both positive. 
The broad set of EPL indicators are mixed in terms of level. As for job protection, the positive 
contribution to the overall growth score comes from the youth unemployment ratio and from an 
indicator of fluidity in the labour market such as the proportion of the long-term unemployed over total 
unemployment. Negative are instead indicators related to involuntary temporary unemployment and in-
work poverty risk. In terms of level the picture is less clear and scores are mixed.  
Policies increasing work time show a performance broadly in line with the EU15 in terms of 
change, while in level terms the relative situation is favourable, with low-wage poverty trap not being a 
major issue. This seems also to be consistent with growth accounting as average hours worked 
represented a drag on GDP growth in 2001-2007 both in Italy and the EU15. By contrast, in terms of 
level, average hours worked gave a substantial contribution to per capita GDP relative to the EU15, 
which is consistent with the positive structural indicator score in level.     
 
Measures promoting female employment aim at increasing GDP growth through three of its 
components: female labour participation rate, women average number of hours worked, and decrease 
in female unemployment. Five potential policy channels can be identified to promote female 
employment: 1) pursuing child care policies aimed at helping women reconcile their professional and 
family lives; 2) scrapping tax disincentives that discourage potential second earners to seek 
employment; 3) opposing job discrimination and ensuring equal opportunities for men and women; 4)  
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increasing investment in female continuing education; 5) improving working conditions. Indicators for 
Italy are mixed and broadly in line with the EU15 both in terms of level and change. It is worth 
mentioning the deeply negative score related to low-wage trap for second-earner income, which is 
negative even in level. Female employment rate and activity rate show substantial negative scores. 
Childcare indicators are mixed, with widely shifting scores among them. Gender segregation in 
occupations and sectors highlights positive results in level but negative in change.   
 
As for older workers, four transmission channels can be identified in order to increase 
participation and employment rates: 1) scrapping early retirement schemes; 2) encouraging older 
workers to remain active by reforming pension systems and extending the working life through 
incentive schemes; 3) favouring a gradual approach to retirement by strengthening part-time work and 
supporting careers of older workers; 4) improving working conditions. Measures in favour of older 
workers could increase labour productivity through greater investment in human capital as a result of a 
longer working life. Indicators show a negative performance in level terms versus the EU15, with the 
employment and activity rates of older workers being clearly a problem. This is matched by poor 
participation rates of the population aged 55-64 as indicated by growth accounting. In terms of change 
the message is more ambiguous.  
  
Employment regulation and wages are also key variables. As wages are  the price of the labour 
factor, they directly impact employment. They also have an indirect effect on the economy through 
their impact on inflation and investment. Along with productivity growth, wage developments determine 
unit labour costs, and thus the competitiveness of the economy. For a given labour productivity growth, 
a larger increase in wages would result in decreased profits and thus have a negative impact on 
investment and exports. Equally, higher disposable income means more household consumption, 
which supports aggregate demand. Labour productivity is another channel: when there is equilibrium 
in the labour market, real wages have to equal the marginal productivity of labour. Unsustainable wage 
agreements can thus widen the spread between wages and productivity, with a resulting decline in 
employment, at least in the short term. Wage moderation indicators show a marginally better 
performance than the EU15 average both in level and change. Wage differentiation indicators show a 
wide dispersion in regional unemployment, which is a long standing issue in Italy and also a relative 
small gap between skilled and unskilled unemployment. In terms of growth, both indicators show a 
decent performance relative to the EU15.    
 
Immigration and integration policies and labour mobility have an impact on growth through the 
reduction of the unemployment rate and the increase in male and female participation rates. 
Increasing regional mobility reduces unemployment by improving the match between supply and 
demand. Regulation of migration flows and integration policies have a direct effect on net migration, 
labour quality, the labour force participation rate of the working-age population, and the unemployment 
rate. Indicators of immigration and integration policies show a marginal negative performance in level 
and a more pronounced negative performance in terms of change. This latter is mainly driven by a 
negative score in the employment gap between non-EU and EU nationals and the employment rate 
gap between non-EU born and EU born. The same indicators are in positive territory in terms of level, 
suggesting that while the level of integration of non-native workers is broadly in line with the EU15 it 
deteriorated between 2001 and 2007. It is worth noting that the indicator of proportion of foreign-born  
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population with tertiary education as a percentage of total foreign-born population is in negative 
territory. Italy’s regional divide shows up in the indicator of dispersion of regional unemployment and 
this in turn (together with the change in the sectoral employment shares) pushes down the overall 
indicator of labour market mismatch and labour mobility in terms of level. The same dispersion 
indicators highlight progress in the period considered.  
 
This brief overview suggests that there are clear interconnections among labour market 
indicators and it would be overly ambitious to encompass the complexities of the labour market by 
simply looking at a relatively small set of structural indicators. Yet, taken together, these indicators can 
provide a reliable, albeit complex, picture of Italy’s position relative to other countries. Italy has 
implemented major labour market reforms, especially since the mid-1990s. They have brought 
noticeable improvement, which slowed down somewhat in the 2001-2007 period. Nevertheless, 
indicators suggest that at 2007 levels Italy’s labour market is still slightly worse off than the EU15 
average, with the exception of policies increasing working time. In terms of progress it is on average 
slightly above the EU15, although with several indicators in negative territory.   
4.2  PRODUCT AND CAPITAL MARKET REGULATIONS 
Moving on to product market indicators, Table 2 shows that they are in negative territory across 
the board in terms of level, with financial markets and access to finance and business dynamics.  
However, most policy areas show also moderate relative progress. Several initiatives have been 
undertaken in Italy on market liberalisation and openness over the past few years. They have 
apparently been effective in improving Italy’s relative position although not enough to completely close 
the gap with the EU15 in 2007.  
Structural reforms in the product market have implications for the economy that are not just 
limited to price reductions through lower mark-ups. All policies that foster competition raise pressure 
on existing firms, yielding beneficial effects at the economy-wide level. Indeed, an increased degree of 
competition generates the correct incentives to innovate and encourages companies to engage in 
innovative activities. In turn, this is likely to have a favourable impact on productivity growth.   
Deregulation in services faces major difficulties and policies do not have an immediate positive 
effect on employment, investment and prices. Nevertheless, the benefits of competition outweigh any 
transition cost on two key arguments: 1) well-designed product market reforms can play a key role in 
boosting productivity and 2) many labour market rigidities are closely linked to product market 
distortions. More specifically, inefficient regulation typically generates economic rents that in turn foster 
additional labour market rigidities (Blanchard, Giavazzi 2003). Hence, reforming product markets may 
facilitate structural changes in labour markets as well. The empirical evidence, while not fully 
uncontroversial, generally suggests that more competition raises productivity, although it often fails to 
take into account the comprehensive sets of factors that may affect the relationship between 
deregulation and productivity. Besides, there are three additional considerations. First, regulatory 
issues and their effects are industry specific, namely the problems faced by network industries, such 
as energy or communications, differ from those of business services, such as accountants or lawyers, 
or those faced by other sectors, including wholesaling and retailing as well as professional services. 
Second, usually the debate on services focuses on their effects on final consumption, while input-
output linkages are rarely considered, even though they are very important. Services account for an  
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important share of total output of other economic activities, such as manufacturing and agriculture. In 
this respect, the efficiency of the tertiary sector has important implications for the efficiency of the 
whole economic system. Third, the service sector remains remarkably less open than manufacturing, 
which implies both that most services are not exposed to international competition (and thus national 
regulation is the only effective channel to raise competition) and that those activities that use services 
as inputs cannot turn to cheaper imported alternatives. This also implies that widespread rigidities in 
the supply of key, largely non tradable, inputs from the service sector discourage foreign direct 
investment (FDI), depriving therefore the host country from a number of beneficial externalities, such 
as gains in wages and productivity. Indeed, FDI has important effects on productivity and growth. It is 
a component of gross capital formation, partly additional to domestic investment. Moreover, the 
activities of multinational enterprises in a host country are generally more efficient than those of 
national firms. Consequently, everything else being equal, the higher the inflows of FDI the stronger 
the growth of average productivity, even if FDI flows were to fully crowd out domestic investment. 
Although service sector reforms are difficult to implement and do not always deliver the expected 
gains, especially in the short term, deregulation of services is found to be associated with faster 
productivity growth and competitiveness both in the service sector and in the rest of the economy. 
Even when gains from reforms in the tertiary sector itself are small, they are magnified when indirect 
effects on the rest of the economy are also taken into account. 
 
Action in favour of liberalisation and more open trade and investment policies is at the root of 
the Lisbon principles. The removal of barriers to free trade and the abolition of national protectionist 
measures are key for productivity growth. Several channels can have a direct effect on productivity: 1) 
optimal use of comparative advantages, by taking advantage of specialisations and different factor 
endowments; 2) increasing investments by introducing incentives to investment flows from foreign 
countries; 3) encouraging more virtuous macroeconomic policies, and improving internal regulation; 4) 
developing growth and employment through increased competitiveness. Indirect channels can also be 
identified. They mainly consist of benefits from larger economies of scale (more open markets), and 
incentives for innovation and absorption of knowledge, which is a factor of endogenous growth.  
The positive association between measures of product market competition and economic 
performance has been documented in a large number of studies. These include, among others, Nickell 
(1996), Nickell, Nicolitsas, and Dryden (1997) and Salgado (2002). This area of investigation has 
received renewed attention after the launch of the OECD research programme on growth (Scarpetta, 
Bassanini, Pilat, and Schreyer, 2000). In particular, productivity differentials have been related to 
measures of product market regulation developed specifically for the purpose (Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and 
Boylaud, 1999). The authors find that the stringency of product market regulations is negatively 
associated with productivity, with the effect being amplified the farther away a country is from the 
technological frontier (Scarpetta and Tressel, 2002).  
A number of actions have been taken to reform Italy’s product markets, including: 1) introducing 
some specific liberalisation measures, 2) strengthening market forces, 3) reducing the administrative 
burden and 4) improving product market regulation. 
Most measures introduced in the past aim at increasing competition in specific areas of the 
service sector, especially by increasing competitive pressure on incumbents. In most cases the 
primary direct effect is a reduction of mark-ups. Over time consumers are expected to reap the benefit 
of the change and enjoy an increase in purchasing power and/or an improvement in the quality of  
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services.  In retailing, provisions that constrain business operation and excessive administrative entry 
barriers are often an obstacle for the creation of high value added stores, they have restrained 
employment creation, as well as limited consumer choice. A review paper by Boylaud (2000) gathers 
some evidence on the impact of regulation easing on opening hours and other restrictions on large-
scale stores. It concludes that these measures have an overall positive effect on the performance and 
efficiency of the sector. Most empirical studies are based on simulation techniques due to the difficulty 
in finding reliable data on both performance and regulatory regimes. Only a few studies take an 
econometric approach using cross-country and time series data on performance and/or regulation (Hoj 
et al. (1995), Pilat (1997). Both studies point unequivocally to potentially large welfare gains, more 
efficient distribution systems and higher employment.  
Given the structure of the Italian retail sector, made up of a large group of small outlets, this 
intervention may have a multifaceted impact both on productivity and quality of supply. It can increase 
the pressure on small outlets from new larger competitors. On the other hand, the new regulatory 
framework can also be exploited by small, locally-rooted shops to enlarge their offer and become more 
productive. The aggregate impact on overall price levels and productivity might not be negligible as the 
value added of the retail sector is approximately 4% of the whole economy. This is an area were 
productivity growth in Italy lags behind the US and most of the other EU countries and thus there is 
room for improvement.  
To what extent greater internal competition has a positive influence on economic growth is an 
open question. The existing theoretical work does not provide a clear-cut answer. However, the most 
influential paper (Aghion et. Al, 1991), argues that there could be a hump-shaped relationship. This 
occurs because increased competitive pressure from a low level, coupled with a desire to preserve 
rents, make companies more willing to invest in innovation. Most of the empirical literature on the 
subject refers to the interaction between internal competition and regulation as a whole. The approach 
followed by Dutz and Hayri (1999) directly addresses the issue of the effectiveness of the Competition 
Authority. In their empirical work, the authors develop three types of indicators related to ‘policy’, 
‘economic structure’ and ‘firms’ mobility’ respectively. First, they introduce several cross country 
comparable policy indicators to capture the quality of the microeconomic incentive regime that puts in 
place a legal and regulatory framework in areas that directly promote competition. Variables are based 
on company-level surveys and are indirect measures of the level of competition in the sense that they 
reflect relevant policy inputs rather than any direct results of the degree of competition. The authors 
find that a 1 point increase in the perceived effectiveness of antitrust regulations enforcement is 
associated with an increase of about 0.4 percentage points in GDP growth. They report a 3.86 (range 
between 1 and 7) value of the ‘antitrust’ variable for Italy. The highest score achieved by major 
countries is approximately 5. Accordingly, if the Italian competition authority were to reach the same 
level of effectiveness, Italy’s GDP growth could rise by almost 0.5 percentage points. 
Economic literature generally predicts that product market reforms and, especially improved 
product market regulation, directly affect firms’ entry and exit rates. Increased competition causes 
internal restructuring of already existing firms, such as organisational changes, the adoption of new 
technologies, increased R&D activities, or a change in the labour and capital mix. There is also an 
external restructuring effect, whereby the process of market selection leads to a reallocation of 
resources among individual firms. This is done in two ways. First, there is a process of creative 
destruction through which low productivity firms exit the market and are replaced by new entrants that 
are themselves heterogeneous. Second, there is a change in market shares among incumbents (in  
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favour of the most productive ones), which will also have an impact on aggregate productivity growth. 
The idea to approach product market regulation reforms from the perspective of their favourable 
impact on entry and exit of firms, and thus on productivity, is utilised by Cincera and Galgau (2005). In 
this paper the effect on productivity is conveyed through three channels. At first, product market 
reforms are expected to lead to a gain in allocation efficiency by reducing the market power of 
incumbent firms and by increasing market contestability. The increase in the level of competition in the 
market will lead to a reduction in price mark-up and to a better allocation of resources as less efficient 
firms exit the market and are replaced by more productive new entrants. The second transmission 
channel is through an increase in productive efficiency achieved by raising the incentives for 
managers and workers to organise their work more efficiently, trim fat and reduce slack, thereby 
minimising the under-utilisation of production factors. The third channel operates by increasing the 
incentives of firms to carry out research and innovate, hence allowing them to embrace the technology 
frontier more rapidly. While the allocation and productive efficiency gains are expected to take place 
rapidly and only once, the dynamic efficiency gains are expected to take place over a longer period of 
time, but to have a larger impact on productivity. The deregulation of product markets will also have a 
positive effect on capital accumulation if it leads to a reduction in the mark-up or lowers the costs of 
adjusting the capital stock. One possible way to assess the impact of reforms in product market 
regulation on entry-exit rates, and hence on growth, is suggested by Cincera and Galgau (2005). 
Controlling for variables deemed to capture, among other factors, technology (e.g capital intensity) and 
cyclical conditions (e.g. demand conditions), the authors explain entry and exit rates with two variables 
proxying product market regulation. Those variables were obtained applying principal components 
analysis to a selected list of indicators. The following step sets out the impact of both entry and exit 
rate on output, employment and productivity growth rates. The authors find that a 1% increase in the 
entry rate leads to an increase of the above variables of 2.2%, 2.7% and 0.6% respectively. A -0.8% 
impact of exit rate is found on GDP growth. The potential gain from improving regulation in Italy is 
deemed to be high as Italy is characterised by the lowest entry rate of all the countries examined. The 
average value for the main EU countries is 5%, for Italy 3.5%.     
 
Business environment policies, which aim at favouring entrepreneurship and entry or exit of 
firms on the market, have a direct impact on productivity through the reduction of enterprise costs. The 
abolition of barriers to entry for new firms allows increasing investment and trade, facilitates innovation 
and the natural selection of the most efficient firms, to the detriment of the less efficient, which can 
however exit the market with limited costs. Even in terms of mark-up, such policies tend to favour 
reduced prices, and a more efficient cost recovery. Market opening policies necessarily have to be 
coupled with greater government control and intervention, in order to ensure competition, impose 
discipline in the various production sectors, liberalise monopolistic or oligopolistic sector, and reduce 
public contributions and subsidies. Greater competitiveness in the business environment can thus 
reduce inflation, by reducing prices through the elimination of monopolistic rents.   
 
Another source of additional growth is represented by the reduction in administrative burdens 
(not included in LAF). Policy can reduce the administrative burden by improving regulation (eliminating 
redundant requirements) and by making the administrative process more efficient. Tang and Verweij 
(2004) provide useful insight on the possible impact of reforms. In their approach, costs are largely 
made up of wages for workers that firms need to hire to comply with administrative requirements.  
   
 
19 
Reducing this cost implies that more workers can contribute to production. This prompts an increase in 
labour efficiency: fewer workers are needed. While production is not affected directly, the increase in 
productivity boosts profitability and therefore investment. The authors feed in a 25% reduction of the 
administrative costs in the EU. The ensuing increase in efficiency generates a direct impact on real 
GDP of around 1.0% in the first year. This follows from a (modest) influx of capital. The higher labour 
efficiency leads to a higher return on investment, thus inducing investors to reallocate funds towards 
the European Union. The effect is even greater over the long term. A higher income implies higher 
savings, more investment and extra capital. When taking into account the link between R&D (spillover 
effects) and productivity, the extra positive effect on productivity leads to an additional increase in real 
GDP, driving up the total long-term effect on real GDP to 1.7%. Knowing the impact on GDP of a 
reduction of administrative costs and using the definition of administrative burden costs documented in 
Kox (2005), we can extrapolate the likely impact of reforms on the Italian economy. The above authors 
consider the administrative burden for companies that stems from mandatory information requirements. 
This measure is consistent with the so-called ‘standard cost model' as approved by the EU 
Commission. They have estimated that for Italy, costs for total administrative requirements are in the 
range of 3.6-4.6% of GDP (48.5 – 61.9 billions of US dollars). Thus, a reform that reduces Italian 
administrative costs by 8.5 billion US dollars, equivalent to 0.5% of GDP, would ensure a GDP gain of 
0.6-0.7 percentage points.  
 
An efficient and accessible financial market favours productivity growth and investments. The 
reduction of capital cost, along with the possibility of investment diversification, facilitates the 
transformation of savings into investments. Increased outcomes, portfolio diversification, participation 
in industrial capital allow financing long-term productive growth and improving investment quality. 
Beside financial investment, investment in R&D and innovation also plays a crucial role. Investment in 
innovation is fundamental for technological progress, which influences growth via TFP. New 
knowledge, technologies and processes allow a more efficient use of productive factors, by pushing 
ahead the production frontier. At the same time, progress modifies the relative prices of production 
factors, and thus their volumes of use; it actually tends to favour a more intense use of capital factor. 
Moreover, technological investment is strictly correlated to labour quality growth. The introduction of 
more sophisticated productive techniques, along with transfers of knowledge and experience, are 
accompanied by knowledge diffusion and formation of human capital. 
 
What are LAF indicators suggesting in the area of product and capital market regulations? The 
overall picture shows an improvement over the period under consideration. Yet, in level terms Italy still 
stands slightly below the EU15 average at the end of the period. What is puzzling is that, despite 
progress, the productivity performance has been dismal as indicated by the growth accounting 
exercise.  
More in detail, the competition policy framework displays a broadly average performance versus 
the EU15, with low dispersion. With only a few exceptions, indicators are within one standard deviation 
from the EU15 average. In terms of level, the exceptions are related to the competition law and policy 
indicator on the positive side, while on the negative side are the average impact of regulation in non-
manufacturing sectors, comparative price levels of final consumption by households and average 
mark-up for total industry (which is deeply negative).   
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Sector specific regulation shows a slightly negative relative performance in terms of level and a 
modest improvement in terms of change. This latter, however, is mainly driven down by the indicator 
of price of telecommunication, which as previously mentioned does not include the price of telephone 
calls when roaming charges apply. In the energy sector the negative performance in level is equally 
affected by prices indicators on electricity, which is mostly the result of higher production costs and not 
an indicator of performance. In terms of change, the market performance is on average positive.  
Moving to market integration, the openness to trade and investment, indicators are broadly in 
line with the EU15, although some indicators are deeply negative. Among the most negative in level 
are: 1) trading across border, time and cost for import, 2) ownership barriers, 3) number of 
infringements cases open for misapplication of internal market rules, and 4) the export performance. 
Some of these indicators would deserve some qualification. In particular, the trading across border 
indicators (in the narrow list) are probably affected by Italy’s geographical and logistic structure rather 
than related to openness to trade and investment. Therefore the overall level indicator, which is slightly 
negative, may unduly be affected by the selection of sub-indicators. Some of these same indicators 
turn positive if look at changes. It is worth noting the progress in the cost of import indicator and the 
number of infringements, as a result of substantial effort over the past few years to reduce 
infringements.  
The business environment was still unfriendly relative to the EU15 in 2007, although there was 
some progress. The overall score is strongly affected by some indicators related to dealing of licences 
and enforcing contracts, which are on average about two standard deviations below the EU15 average. 
This is partly related to inefficiencies of the judicial system and the public administration.  Many of 
these indicators show, however, some progress over the period under exam.  
The indicators of business dynamics and start-up conditions are also sizably negative in level, 
especially as for the cost of closing and starting a business. The same indicators show some progress, 
with the exception of the time needed to close a business.  
The indicator of financial markets and access to finance records a slightly negative performance 
in level and is flat in change. Some level indicators are nevertheless deeply negative such as the legal 
rights in getting credit or the access to financial services.  
4.3  INNOVATION, KNOWLEDGE AND MACROECONOMY 
Economic theory establishes a positive link between technological change, productivity and 
economic growth. Process innovation provides opportunities for cost reduction. Product innovation 
enhances either the range of available intermediate inputs for the production process, increasing real 
output, or increases the availability of consumer products with corresponding welfare gains. Indeed,  
the inputs of capital and labour alone cannot account for a large part of output growth in modern 
economies. The concept of TFP has been widely used as a measure to explain this residual. The total 
factor productivity residual has been related to the accumulation of a ‘knowledge stock’, which is not 
accounted for in the measurement of the conventional capital stock, but increases output via 
innovation and technological change. R&D expenditures have been suggested as a way of measuring 
this knowledge stock, and this has led to a range of works relating R&D expenditure to total factor 
productivity growth. This is consistent with the notion in ‘new growth theory’ of non-convexities of R&D 
and knowledge in output, which results in self-sustaining growth. The work of Griliches (1979, 1992) 
accounts for the notion that R&D not only provides productivity benefits for the firms that undertake it,  
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but also for other firms in similar or somehow related lines of business. This is the notion of R&D 
spillovers, indicating that the impact of innovation and technology is felt widely rather than being a 
private pay-off. A paper by Meister and Verspagen (2004) models the above notion by introducing an 
augmented Cobb-Douglas production function that includes, in addition to labour and capital, a 
variable that captures the stock of R&D expenditure. A similar approach is adopted in defining the 
production function in a study prepared by the European Commission (2004) to illustrate the impact of 
an increase in R&D expenditure. A particular feature of R&D policies is that their main effects take 
place over long time periods. These time periods represent the time taken for R&D investment to 
produce innovations and for these innovations to pervade the market. In the first years, GDP growth is 
mostly induced by increases in expenditure and employment linked to research. During this period, 
very little supply effects show up; private sector deficit increases (as the Lisbon strategy is mainly 
based on the private financing to research contribution) and the external balance worsens. In the long 
run, R&D investment foster innovations that substantially modify supply and demand conditions: 
process innovations enable a decrease in the prices of goods and services; product innovations 
increase the quality of goods and services. This enables a period of growth based on strong internal 
demand, competitiveness and the restructuring of economic activities towards knowledge-based 
productive sectors. All these effects are accounted for by the European Commission (2004) paper. 
The paper evaluates the impact of increasing total EU R&D spending to 3% of GDP in 2010 when 
compared to a status quo situation – i.e. no increase in R&D spending, thus remaining at 1.9% of GDP. 
In this study, GDP level would increase by 1.7 percentage points by 2010 (0.25 percentage points per 
year). TFP, employment and real income levels would increase by 0.8, 1.4 and 3.0 percentage points 
respectively. In the long run, the GDP level increases by 4.2, 7.5 and 12.1 percentage points in 2015, 
2020 and 2030 respectively.  
Griffith, R, Redding, S and Van Reenen, J (2000) give evidence on R&D effects on both rates of 
innovation and technology transfer, providing two potential fonts of productivity growth for countries 
behind the technological frontier (more is the distance from the frontier and greater is the increase in 
TFP growth).  
By analysing the strong correlation between IT capital accumulation and labour productivity, 
Stiroh (2002) supports the idea that aggregate productivity’ acceleration is a real event and not only a 
cyclical one; this implies a deeper relationship (as much as IT investment is widespread) between IT 
investment and productivity growth.  
Other studies place more emphasis on the quality of R&D spending. Meister and Verspagen 
(2006), for instance, say that there should be more attention to the institutional context in which 
innovation and technological development take place. The effect of R&D spending depends on the 
structure of the economy. A word of caution is thus needed. Different technological specialisations 
among countries imply different needs for innovation, and thus, for R&D. Moreover, not all countries 
are at the leading edge of the technological frontier and Italy is probably in some sectors but not in 
others; a sudden boost in R&D spending might remain without effect in some countries, as their 
development is still based on catching-up and not yet on innovation. Spending on R&D, as well as in 
other inputs, should not be decided according to its marginal return. 
Italy allocates 1.1% of GDP to R&D
5, one of the lowest levels in the EU. Moreover, the source of 
R&D financing comes more from the public sector in Italy than in the EU15. In the area of innovation 
and knowledge, Italy lags behind the rest of the EU15, despite good progress in 2001-2007. Growth in 
                                                       
5 Source: ISTAT, latest data refers to 2005.  
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indicators has been supported by measures to: 1) expand venture capital markets by better integrating 
existing financial instruments to facilitate all forms of innovation, 2) enhance the functionality of the 
national patent system, 3) increase funds to support activities of companies based abroad and 
optimise the support for SMEs, 4) promote private spending on R&D, 5) implement the system of 
portals to facilitate the spread and effective use of ICT, and 6) increase synergies between universities 
and companies and promote technology transfer.  
Progress was significant in the area of R&D and innovation in 2001-2007, although it was not 
enough to close the gap with EU15 countries. In ICT the score is average both in terms of level and 
growth, while for education and life-long learning the relative progress is modest and the negative level 
gap is still wide. More in detail, the indicator of science and technology graduates as a percentage of 
the population is significantly below the EU15 average, although there is significant progress. Venture 
capital activity is still underdeveloped, high-tech exports are a smaller share of total relative to the 
EU15. ICT expenditure is pretty low, household internet access is equally low, e-commerce is 
underdeveloped and the e-government usage by individuals is deeply below the EU15 average. 
Education and life-long learning show modest public and private expenditure on education per student 
relative to per capita GDP. The share of tertiary-educated employment over total employment is low 
and the PISA score is below the EU15 average. Yet, again, for most of these indicators the progress is 
substantial. 
 
Taking into account all the above considerations and looking at the indicators of Table 2, we 
can conclude that there was substantial progress in 2001-2007, which in time may lead to enhanced 
economic growth, but this progress was not enough to lift Italy’s level score and bring it into line with 
the EU15 average.  
5  ASSESSMENT OF PRIORITIES 
By applying the LAF methodology this section helps identify policy priorities and areas that need 
to be tackled to improve Italy’s relative position vis-à-vis the EU15. It combines the assessments on 
GDP components with that on policy areas to highlight the most important reform priorities and policy 
challenges.  
 
The link between GDP components and policy areas is based on the analysis of the relevant 
literature. For example, a survey of the economic literature establishes a theoretical link between 
older-worker participation and the following policy areas: ALMPs, making work-pay, job protection, 
specific labour supply measures for older workers and women. Grey areas in Table 3 represent the 
relationship between policies and components of growth as suggested by the economic literature. For 
instance, Table 3 shows that low labour-market participation can be reduced through policies intended 
to make work pay; these policies would also support TFP. In addition, the latter is supported by R&D 
spending and innovation, which improves labour quality and capital deepening. Education and life-long 
learning are important both for labour market participation and productivity.  
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Bringing together the results of the analysis of GDP components and that of policy and 
performance indicators, we can infer that the performance in the determinant of GDP could be 
attributed to a wide array of policy issues (see Table 4). More specifically, the analysis shows that the 
low participation rate could be accounted for by a set of specific underperforming policies, such as 
implementing active labour market policies, making work-pay, relaxing job protection, introducing 
specific labour supply measures for women and older-workers, increasing labour mobility and 
enhancing education and life-long learning. These policy indicators show mixed results for Italy. There 
is no significant relative improvement, with the exception of active labour market policies, and levels 
are in line or slightly below the EU15 average. Yet, with the exception of youth participation, there is 
overall progress in participation in 2001-2007, although not enough to bring it into line with the EU15 
average. This may be explained by either lack of progress in other EU15 countries not properly 
reflected in negative policy indicators or with the lag effect of policies implemented in Italy in the 
second half of the 1990s.  
As to labour quality, policy indicators more directly linked to this GDP component are market 
integration, in terms of openness to trade and investment, R&D and innovation, education and life-long 
learning. In level terms, these policy indicators all show negative signs, while there is some progress in 
all cases. This is in line with the GDP component that shows serious underperformance in terms of 
level, but also a modest improvement over the years.  
R&D and innovation, education and life-long learning and business dynamics indicators show 
the most negative outcome in terms of level. These policy areas are linked to TFP where Italy 
significantly underperforms the EU15 both in level and growth. The performance in TFP is also 
affected by a number of other policies, notably a few labour market policies and all product and capital 
marker regulation policies as well as ICT. Not surprisingly, with the exception of policies that increase 
working time, these indicators are all negative or zero in terms of level. However, non-labour market 
indicators related to TFP also show some progress in 2001-2007. This may be explained by either 
some relative progress in TFP in other EU15 countries not properly reflected in positive policy 
indicators or with the lag effect of policies, especially regulatory changes, implemented before the 
period under observation.  
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Table 3. Link between GDP components and policy areas based on the economic literature  
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Active labour market policies                                     
Making work-pay: interplay of tax and benefit system                               
Labour taxation to stimulate labour demand                                      
Job protection and labour market segmentation/dualisation                                     
Policies increasing working time                                     
Specific labour supply measures for women                                     
Specific labour supply measures for older-workers                                     
Wage bargaining and wage-setting policies                                     
Immigration and integration policies                                     
Labour market mismatch and labour mobility                                     
Competition policy framework                                     
Sector specific regulation (telecoms, energy)                                     
Business environment - Regulatory barriers to entrepreneurship                         
Business Dynamics - Start-up conditions                                     
Financial markets and access to finance                                     
Market integration - Openness to trade and investment                                     
R&D and Innovation                                     
ICT                                     
Education and life-long learning                                     
Orientation and sustainability of public finances                                      
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Table 4. Policy areas likely responsible for GDP performance 
Policy area  Level  Growth 
  (*)  GDP components involved  (*)  GDP components involved 
Labour market         
Active labour market policies  S  Youth Participation    Youth Participation 
    25-54 Female Participation     
    25-54 Male Participation     
   55-64  Participation     
Making work-pay: interplay of tax and  S  Youth Participation  B  Youth Participation 
benefit system    25-54 Female Participation    Total Factor Productivity 
    25-54 Male Participation     
   55-64  Participation 
Total Factor Productivity 
   
Labour taxation to stimulate labour demand  S       
Job protection and labour market  B  Youth  Participation  S  Youth Participation 
segmentation/dualisation    25-54 Female Participation    Total Factor Productivity 
    25-54 Male Participation     
   55-64  Participation 
Total Factor Productivity 
   
Policies increasing working time    Total Factor Productivity    Total Factor Productivity 
Specific labour supply measures for women  S  Youth Participation 
25-54 Female Participation 
S  Youth Participation 
 
   55-64 Participation     
Specific labour supply measures for  B  55-64 Participation     
older workers         
Wage bargaining and wage-setting policies  S       
Immigration and integration policies  S  Net migration  B   
Labour market mismatch and labour 
mobility 
B Youth  Participation 
25-54 Female Participation 
  Youth Participation 
    25-54 Male Participation     
Product and capital market regulations         
Competition policy framework  S  Total Factor Productivity 
Capital Deepening 
S  Total Factor Productivity 
Capital Deepening 
Sector specific regulation (telecoms, 
energy) 
S  Total Factor Productivity 
Capital Deepening 
  Total Factor Productivity 
Capital Deepening 
Market integration – Openness to trade   S  Total Factor Productivity    Total Factor Productivity 
and investment    Capital Deepening    Capital Deepening 
   Labour  Quality     
Business environment – Regulatory barriers 
to entrepreneurship 
B  Total Factor Productivity 
Capital Deepening 
  Total Factor Productivity 
Capital Deepening 
Business Dynamics – Start-up conditions  B  Total Factor Productivity 
Capital Deepening 
B  Total Factor Productivity 
Capital Deepening 
Financial markets and access to finance  S  Total Factor Productivity    Total Factor Productivity 
   Capital  Deepening    Capital Deepening 
Innovation and Knowledge         
R&D and Innovation  B  Labour Quality    Total Factor Productivity 
Capital Deepening 
ICT  S  Total Factor Productivity 
Capital Deepening 
  Total Factor Productivity 
Capital Deepening 
Education and life-long learning  B Youth  Participation  S  Youth Participation 
    25-54 Female Participation    Total Factor Productivity 
    25-54 Male Participation     
   55-64  Participation 
Labour Quality (Education) 
   
    Total Factor Productivity     
The macro economy         
Orientation and sustainability of public   S  Capital Deepening  S  Capital Deepening 
finances        
(*) Existence of policy issue(s): B= ‘Broad policy issue’ means that the aggregate index shows underperformance (aggregate 
score is below -4 in Table 2), while S= ‘Specific policy issue’ indicates that only a set of sub-indicators shows underperformance.  




Is there a match between the weaknesses highlighted by the LAF scores on the one hand, and 
Italy’s own policy objectives and the EU and OECD policy recommendations on the other? This 
paragraph compares the LAF scores (level and growth) with Italy’s own policy objectives as defined in  
the ‘key challenges’ of the National Reform Programme, the evaluation of policy areas by the 
European Commission, i.e. the 2007 Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs) and Points To 
Watch (PTW), as well as the 2007 OECD indicator-based and qualitative recommendations in ‘Going 
for Growth’. In 2001-2007, Italy made progress mainly in those areas where the level scores show 
underperformance (Table 5). This seems to suggest that, broadly speaking, the right policy issues 
were addressed, but also that the progress achieved relative to the EU15 average was not enough to 
close the gap in terms of level. As a result, recent policy recommendations still insist on the weak 
areas where progress was most notable but also insufficient.  
In particular, there are a Key Challenge, a Specific Recommendation and two Points to Watch in 
the labour market. The Key Challenge and the Specific Recommendation relate to labour taxation and 
mobility, in order to increase the efficiency of the labour market through added demand and a better 
match between supply and demand. Indicators show a broadly effective policy response and some 
relative underperformance in terms of growth accounting. Increased flexibility in wage determination, 
through stronger links between pay and productivity remains a priority according to the OECD. 
The European Commission pays special attention to the regulation of product and capital 
markets, and recommends that Italy should pursue the implementation of structural reforms to ensure 
competitiveness and free access to goods and services markets. Policy indicators placing Italy in line 
with the European average confirm the small progress that was achieved and the results obtained in 
the areas of competition policies, sector-based regulation, market integration and regulatory barriers to 
entrepreneurship. The interest showed by the Commission – via a specific PTW – and the OECD in 
removing barriers to entry for new firms and encouraging start-ups is particularly relevant. On the 
whole, some progress was made in this macro area, but the reform process still needs to be 
strengthened. 
Italy shows an innovation and knowledge deficit. More specifically, the progress in R&D made in 
2001-2007, as suggested by the relative growth indicators, did not produce the desired effects in terms 
of productivity gains. It is thus not surprising that this area remains a key challenge for the country and 
is highlighted by a specific PTW. Education and training are also critical areas: here Italy posted only a 
minor relative improvement, which did not change significantly the underperformance in level 
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Table 5: Mapping the LAF scores with policy recommendations 






























































































Labour market            
Active labour market policies  -3 10          
Making work-pay: interplay of tax and benefit system  0   - 5        
Labour taxation to stimulate labour demand   -4  8  X  X  
Job protection and labour market 
segmentation/dualisation   -5  -3       
Policies increasing working time  13  3       
Specific labour supply measures for women  -3  -1     X    
Specific labour supply measures for older workers  -5  2     X    
Wage bargaining and wage-setting policies  0  6       X 
Immigration and integration policies  -2  -7       
Labour market mismatch and labour mobility  - 6   2   X       
Product and capital market regulations           
Competition policy framework  -1  1  X  X    X 
Sector specific regulation (telecoms, energy)  -2  3  X  X     
Market integration - Openness to trade and investment  - 2   2   X       
Business environment - Regulatory barriers to 
entrepreneurship  -8 3      X X   
Business Dynamics - Start-up conditions  - 1 1   - 5        
Financial markets and access to finance  - 4   0        
Innovation and knowledge           
R&D and Innovation  -8  9    X  X    
ICT  - 1   1        
Education and life long learning  -8  2  X  X  X  
Macroeconomy           
Orientation and sustainability of public finances  -4  -1   X  X       
Environment and sustainable development        X    X     
Infrastructure        X    X      
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7 SECTORAL  PERFORMANCE 
The above analysis considers the Italian economy as a whole; however, there is an important 
sectoral dimension. Could Italy’s poor GDP and overall productivity performance be mostly attributed 
to unfavourable trends in one or more specific sectors?  
A more detailed analysis carried out at (macro) sectoral level shows that the decline in 
productivity, with only a few exceptions, affects the whole Italian economy. Furthermore, changes in 
the mix of employment by sector, with employment shifting away from sectors with higher productivity 
to sectors with lower productivity (the typical employment outflow from the manufacturing to the 
services sector), had only a limited impact in relative terms.  
With a view to highlighting sectoral trends at EU and international level, the European 
Commission sponsored a project for the development of a database known as EU KLEMS
6. Various 
research centres were involved in the project. The version of the database published in March 2008 is 
very detailed in terms of its breakdown (up to 60 sectors) and covers almost 30 countries. However, 
thus far, the database contains only data through 2005 and these data are still subject to quality 
screening on the part of national statistical offices.  Even bearing in mind this caveat, EU KLEMS data 
can help providing some preliminary indications on Italy's performance vis-à-vis the rest of Europe. 
The EU KLEMS breakdown of growth is provided in Table 6. Italy's growth dynamics is 
measured with respect to the EU15ex aggregate
7 between 1995 and 2005. Estimates of growth 
components may differ with respect to those in the previous paragraph due to different time intervals 
and databases. The contribution of labour as a production factor is divided into a component based on 
the number of hours worked and another one based on labour quality (as determined by age and level 
of education). The contribution of the capital factor is represented by an ICT component and a non-ICT 
component. The contribution to growth due to changes in total factor productivity is proxied by the 
residual. A first level of analysis looks at the entire economy and six macro sectors: manufacturing, 
private services, financial services, distribution, electrical machinery and other industrial goods.  
Results at the aggregate level are broadly consistent with the analysis in previous sections. In 
the period examined, Italy grew about 1 percentage point below the EU15ex (value added). This poor 
performance can be related to a productivity gap. The contribution of the capital factor to growth is 
broadly in line with the European average, i.e. there was no ‘investment deficit'. Relative to the 
EU15ex, Italy shows a larger accumulation of the traditional capital goods component (non-ICT), in 
line with the country’s production specialisation. The poor productivity performance is widespread, 
affecting all the macro sectors examined except financial services. The gap is particularly significant in 
manufacturing (-1.9 percentage points) and retailing (-1.5 percentage points). Repeating the analysis 
with a more detailed breakdown into 31 sectors gives some additional insight (Figure 2 and 3). The 
breakdown shows the shift in value added and contribution to growth of each production factor vis-à-
                                                       
6 The objective is to set up a database for analysing the sectoral productivity for the EU Member States, with a breakdown for 
contributions of capital (K), labour (L), energy (E), material (M) and service inputs (S). 
7 These are the countries for which data on capital stock is available for breaking down growth. The group includes all of the 
EU15 countries, except for Ireland, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal and Sweden.  
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vis the EU15ex. Italy's gap in value added growth can be attributed to four sectors: real estate services, 
retail sales, optical and electrical equipment, and financial intermediation. By contrast, in the 
construction sector the gap is in Italy’s favour. Total factor productivity declines across the board vis-à-
vis the European average in almost all sectors examined.  Particularly negative are the real estate 
sector, wholesale, and retail sales. Instead, there are some gains in public administration, healthcare 
and rental of machinery and equipment, and services to businesses. As to the contribution of labour, 
healthcare, public administration and education, these sectors show lower growth than the EU15ex, 
whereas use of labour increases in the mechanical industry, services to businesses, and wholesaling. 
These sectors achieve the best performance vis-à-vis the EU15ex average in terms of labour 
contribution to growth almost exclusively due to a higher number of hours worked rather than a better 
qualitative mix of labour. Several segments of the manufacturing sector, wholesaling, construction and 
services to businesses show relative good performance. Public administration, healthcare, education, 
retailing and farming and fishing experience a relative decline both in terms of the number of hours 
worked and the change in the mix of labour. The only sectors that show a qualitative improvement in 
labour, albeit a very minor one, vis-à-vis the European average, are construction, chemicals, rubber 
and plastic, mining and transportation supply. As for the contribution of capital, the gap vis-à-vis the 
European average widens in two sectors:  rental of machinery and equipment and financial 
intermediation. By contrast, the wholesaling and real estate sectors improve their performance. Capital 
is mostly concentrated in non-ICT investments, thus showing that Italy’s technological investment is 
still weak when compared with other countries. The only exception seems to be real estate activity. 
 
Overall, these results are broadly consistent with the analysis implemented by using the LAF 
framework, although there are some useful additional sectoral insights. Further analysis on sectoral 
developments (that goes beyond the purpose of this paper) may provide useful hints on the reasons 
behind the mismatch between GDP performance and the progress recorded by structural indicators.  
  
   
 
30 
Table 6. Gross value added, growth and contributions, 1995-2005 (annual growth rates) 
 (annual growth rates*, %)  VA  L  H  LC  K  KIT  KNIT  MFP 
  (1)=(2)+(5)+(8) (2)=(3)+(4)  (3)  (4)  (5)=(6)+(7)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
ITALY                 
Market economy*  1.2  0.8  0.7  0.2  1.0  0.3  0.8  -0.7 
Electrical machinery, postal and tele-
communications services  4.4  -0.2     -0.2  0.1  1.9  0.5  1.4  2.7 
Manufacturing excluding electrical equipment  -0.7  -0.3  -0.4  0.1  0.7  0.2  0.6  -1.2 
Other goods producing industries**  1.3  0.4  0.2  0.2  1.1  0.1  1.0  -0.1 
Distribution services  1.2  0.8  0.4  0.3  1.3  0.3  1.1  -0.9 
Financial and business services***  2.9  2.6  2.4  0.2  0.7  0.6  0.2  -0.4 
Personal and social services***  0.9  1.7  1.6  0.1  1.2  0.3  1.0  -2.0 
EU15                 
Market economy**  2.2  0.6  0.4  0.2  1.2  0.6  0.6  0.4 
Electrical machinery, postal and 
telecommunications services   5.5  -0.4  -0.6  0.2  1.7  1.2  0.5  4.1 
Manufacturing excluding electrical equipment  0.8  -0.4  -0.7  0.3  0.6  0.3  0.3  0.7 
Other goods producing industries**  1.1  0.0  -0.1  0.2  0.7  0.1  0.6  0.4 
Distribution services  2.3  0.6  0.5  0.1  1.1  0.4  0.7  0.6 
Financial and business services***  3.6  2.2  1.9  0.3  2.2  1.3  0.9  -0.8 
Personal and social services***  1.7  1.5  1.4  0.1  1.0  0.3  0.7  -0.8 
* Unmatching sums are due to rounding effects, ** excluding agriculture, *** excluding private households  
VA= Gross Value Added growth 
L= Contribution of Labour input growth  
H= Contribution of Total hours worked 
LC= Contribution of Labour composition 
K= Contribution of Capital input growth 
KIT= Contribution of ICT capital        
KNIT= Contribution of Non-ICT capital        
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(weighted mean 1995 2005 Eu 15 less Italy)
-0.10 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70
TOTAL INDUSTRIES
  Real estate activities
     Ret ail t r ade
    Financial intermediation
   Electrical and optical equipment
     Transport equipment
    Electricity, gas and water supply
     Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear
     Sale of motor vehicles;retail sale of fuel
     Chemicals and chemical products
     Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
    Transport and storage
    Other community, social and personal services
   Health and social work
   Education
   Post and telecommunications
     Rubber and plastics products
     Food products, beverages and tobacco
     Machinery, nec
     Wholesale trade and commission trade
     Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing
     Manufacturing nec; recycling
    Private households with employed persons
     Wood and products of wood and cork
   Public admin and defence; compulsory social
securit y
     Other non-metallic mineral products
    Hotels and restaurants
    Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing
     Basic metals and fabricated metal products
    Mining and quarrying
    Renting of m&eq and other business activities
    Construction
Contribution of labour input to value added growth
 (weighted m ean 1 995-2005 Eu1 5 less Italy)
-0.10 -0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
TOTAL INDUSTRIES
   Health and social work
   Public admin and defence; compulsory social security
   Education
     Retail trade
    Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing
  Real estate activities
   Post and telecommunications
     Transport equipment
    Financial intermediation
     Sale of motor vehicles;retail sale of fuel
    Other community, social and personal services
     Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear
    Private households with employed persons
     Manufacturing nec; recycling
     Wood and products of wood and cork
     Rubber and plastics products
    Electricity, gas and water supply
     Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
     Food products, beverages and tobacco
    Mining and quarrying
     Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing
     Basic metals and fabricated metal products
     Chemicals and chemical products
    Hotels and restaurants
     Other non-metallic mineral products
     Machinery, nec
    Transport and storage
   Electrical and optical equipment
    Construction
    Renting of m&eq and other business activities
     Wholesale trade and commission trade
Contribution of capital input to value added growth
 (weighted mean 1995-2005 Eu15 less Italy)
-0.10 -0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
TOTAL INDUSTRIES
    Renting of m&eq and other business activities
    Financial intermediation
   Health and social work
     Transport equipment
     Chemicals and chemical products
   Post and telecommunications
    Transport and storage
   Educat ion
    Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing
   Electrical and optical equipment
    Mining and quarrying
    Electricity, gas and water supply
     Wood and products of wood and cork
     Rubber and plastics products
     Manufacturing nec; recycling
    Private households with employed persons
   Public admin and defence; compulsory social security
     Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing
     Mac hiner y, nec
     Food products, beverages and tobacco
     Other non-metallic mineral products
     Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear
    Hotels and restaurants
     Basic metals and fabricated metal products
    Construction
     Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
     Sale of motor vehicles and motorcycles;retail sale of fuel
    Other community, social and personal services
     Retail trade
     Wholesale trade and commission trade
  Real es tate activities
Contribution of TFP to value added growth
 (weighted mean 1995-2005 Eu15 less Italy)
-0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
TOTAL INDUSTRIES
  Real estate activities
     Wholesale trade and commission trade
     Ret ail t r ade
   Electrical and optical equipment
     Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
    Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing
     Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear
     Sale of motor vehicles; retail sale of fuel
    Transport and storage
    Electricity, gas and water supply
    Other community, social and personal services
     Machiner y , nec
     Chemicals and chemical products
     Transport equipment
     Food products, beverages and tobacco
    Hotels and restaurants
     Other non-metallic mineral products
     Rubber and plastics products
     Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing
     Basic metals and fabricated metal products
     Manufacturing nec; recycling
    Private households with employed persons
    Financial intermediation
     Wood and products of wood and cork
    Mining and quarrying
    Construction
   Post and telecommunications
   Education
   Public admin and defence; compulsory social
securit y
   Health and social work
    Renting of m&eq and other business activities 
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Contribution of hours worked to value added growth
 (weighted mean 1 995-2005 Eu1 5 less Italy)
-0.07 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07
TOTAL INDUSTRIES
   Health and social work
   Education
   Public admin and defence; compulsory social
securit y
     Ret ai l t r ade
    Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing
  Real es tate activities
   Post and telecommunications
     Transport equipment
    Other community, social and personal services
     Sale of motor vehicles;retail sale of fuel
     Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear
    Private households with employed persons
     Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
    Electricity, gas and water supply
     Wood and products of wood and cork
    Financial intermediation
     Manufacturing nec; recycling
     Rubber and plastics products
     Food products, beverages and tobacco
    Mining and quarrying
     Chemicals and chemical products
     Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing
    Hotels and restaurants
     Other non-metallic mineral products
     Basic metals and fabricated metal products
     Machiner y , nec
    Transport and storage
   Electrical and optical equipment
    Construction
    Renting of m&eq and other business activities
     Wholesale trade and commission trade
Contribution of labour composition to value added growth 
(weighted m ean 1 995-2005 Eu1 5 less Italy)
-0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
TOTAL INDUSTRIES
    Renting of m&eq and other business activities
  Real estate activities
   Public admin and defence; compulsory social security
   Health and social work
   Education
   Electrical and optical equipment
    Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing
     Sale of motor vehicles;retail sale of fuel
    Electricity, gas and water supply
   Post and telecommunications
     Food products, beverages and tobacco
    Hot els and r est aur ant s
     Basic metals and fabricated metal products
     Ret ail t r ade
    Other community, social and personal services
     Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing
    Financial intermediation
     Manufacturing nec; recycling
    Private households with employed persons
     Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
     Wood and products of wood and cork
    Transport and storage
     Wholesale trade and commission trade
     Mac hiner y , nec
     Other non-metallic mineral products
     Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear
    Mining and quarrying
     Rubber and plastics products
     Transport equipment
     Chemicals and chemical products
    Construction
Contribution of ICT capital services to value added growth
 (weighted mean 1995-2005 Eu15 less Italy)
-0.15 -0.10 -0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
TOTAL INDUSTRIES
    Renting of m&eq and other business activities
    Financial intermediation
   Post and telecommunications
    Transport and storage
     Wholesale trade and commission trade
   Electrical and optical equipment
   Health and social work
     Chemicals and chemical products
   Educ at i on
     Transport equipment
    Construction
    Electricity, gas and water supply
     Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing
     Machinery, nec
   Public admin and defence; compulsory social security
     Ret ail t r ade
     Food products, beverages and tobacco
     Basic metals and fabricated metal products
     Rubber and plastics products
     Sale of motor vehicles and motorcycles;retail sale of
fuel
    Mining and quarrying
     Manufacturing nec; recycling
     Wood and products of wood and cork
    Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing
     Other non-metallic mineral products
    Other community, social and personal services
    Private households with employed persons
     Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
    Hotels and restaurants
     Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear
  Real es tate activities
Contribution of non-ICT capital services to value added growth
 (weighted mean 1 995-2005 Eu1 5 less Italy)
-0.10 -0.07 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.08
TOTAL INDUSTRIES
    Renting of m&eq and other business activities
  Real es tate activities
    Financial intermediation
     Transport equipment
   Health and social work
     Chemicals and chemical products
    Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing
   Educ at i on
    Mining and quarrying
    Private households with employed persons
     Wood and products of wood and cork
     Manufacturing nec; recycling
     Rubber and plastics products
    Transport and storage
    Electricity, gas and water supply
   Public admin and defence; compulsory social security
   Electrical and optical equipment
     Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing
     Mac hi ner y , nec
     Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear
     Other non-metallic mineral products
     Food products, beverages and tobacco
    Hotels and restaurants
     Basic metals and fabricated metal products
     Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
   Post and telecommunications
    Other community, social and personal services
     Sal e of  mot or  v ehi c l es; r et ail  sale of  f uel
    Construction
     Retail trade
     Wholesale trade and commission trade 




Italy’s GDP growth significantly underperformed that of the EU15 in 2001-2007, notwithstanding 
greater progress in reforms. This appears to be the main message from the analysis of growth 
accounting and structural indicators.  
Growth accounting shows that modest GDP growth, with a gap of almost 1 percentage point 
versus the EU15, was explained by dismal productivity performance. This performance was 
accompanied by low, even negative, changes in total factor productivity. Besides, the contribution of 
employment was positive as was that of the participation and unemployment rates. Also the 
contribution of the working-age population turned positive due to intense migration flows, while GDP 
growth was slightly dragged down by the number of hours worked. 
The decline in both total factor productivity and the number of hours worked may partly reflect 
positive developments in the labour market, which appear to be the most relevant phenomenon in the 
period considered. Following major changes in the second half of the 1990s, the reform process 
continued in 2001-2007. The increase in labour flexibility and cheaper labour relative to capital as a 
factor of production prompted substantial hiring, probably at the expense of lower marginal productivity, 
suggesting a possible trade-off between these two components. This factor, however, would only 
partly explain the developments that occurred. Leaving aside the performance of the labour market, 
sectoral and regional differences also provide some hints on possible reasons behind Italy’s poor GDP 
growth performance.  
The analysis of structural indicators show that there was progress in reforms in 2001-2007 as 
against the EU15, although this appears to have had little impact on economic growth or on its 
components in relative terms. Relative progress was moderate in labour market indicators, following 
notable improvement in previous years, and in product and capital market regulations and innovation 
and knowledge. In both areas, the relative performance in level is unsatisfactory.  
According to LAF, Italy made a slightly bigger effort than other countries on the reform side. Yet 
its economic performance was relatively dismal. Comparative analysis of GDP components and 
structural indicators cancel cyclical and structural phenomena that are common to EU15 countries. 
Leaving aside some possible asynchrony, relative performance should thus highlight only country- 
specific factors. This leaves few possible answers. First, the reform process in Italy started later than 
in other EU15 countries, and thus the effects may have yet to come. Second, it could be that reforms 
are not as effective in stimulating economic activity as the economic literature suggests, and this may 
be especially true for Italy due to country-specific reasons. Reforms take place in a particularly difficult 
environment in Italy, which make them less effective. This would mean that a lot more needs to be 
done for reforms to produce visible results. Third, this may suggest that, despite the analytical work 
done in selecting structural indicators and the effort of statistical offices in recording economic 
phenomena, there are still measurement problems to be solved. Finally, it may be a combination of the 
above. More research is needed into Italy’s reform process.    
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DETAILED ANALYSIS OF EACH POLICY AREAS ACCORDING TO LIME METHODOLOGY 
 
These tables break down each overall aggregate score in Table 2 into its policy and performance 
component scores. The grey area highlights indicators that are included in the narrow list . All other 
indicators in the wider list are excluded from the aggregate scores for statistical inaccuracies or breaks 
in the series. Some indicators may be missing for some countries and particular care should be paid to 
breaks in the series (for example, some LFS series were affected by methodological changes, thereby 
reducing the comparability of these series). So the symbols “+” and “-“ signal the level of statistical 
accuracy of the indicators (good or limited). Finally, we report the time coverage of the series and the 
weight used in the calculation of aggregate score (used to avoid indicator redundancy and high 
correlation between some indicators).    
 
Active labour market policies  
   Characteristics of indicator  Results 
  






   Absolute  Relative 
EU15 
ALMP expenditure as % of GDP (+)  pol 2000-2006      -3  ↓ 9 
Number of participants in LMP (categories from 2-7) 
measures divided by the number of persons wanting to work 
(+) 
pol  2004-2006   1/3  -5       
Active LMP expenditure per person wanting to work (+)  pol  2004-2006   1/3  -5  ↓  4 
Passive LMP expenditures as % of GDP (-)  pol 2000-2006  7  ↓ -6 
Passive LMP expenditures per person wanting to work (-)  pol 2004-2006    9  ↓ -9 
Employment service expenditure per person wanting to work 
(+)  pol 2004-2006    -11  ↓ -3 
Proportion of the unemployed in education and training (+)  pol 2000-2007    -4  ↑ -4 
Proportion of the inactive in education and training (+)  pol 2000-2007    -3  ↓ -8 
Long-term unemployment rate (-)  perf  1999-2007   1/3  -1  ↑  16 
Youth unemployment ratio (-)  perf  2000-2007   1/3  6  ↑  19 
Employment rate - 15-64 age group-Pre-primary, primary 
and lower secondary education - levels 0-2 (ISCED 1997) 
(LFS) (%) (+) 
perf  1999-2007   1/3  -8  ↑  2 
Ratio of active to  passive LMP expenditures (+)  pol 2000-2006    7  ↓ -5 
Regular activation in training (EMCO 19M2) (+)  pol  2006   1/3          
     
Aggregate score (based on the Narrow list)           -3     10 
  




Making work-pay: interplay of tax and benefit system 
   Characteristics of indicator  Results 
  







   Abs  Relative 
EU15 
Unemployment benefit duration, months (-median of the min-max range) (-)  pol 2004    9       
Unemployment benefit duration, months (Taxing Wages Report (2006) and 
MISSOC database 2004 -max range) (-)  pol 2004    11      
Average unemployment benefit duration (years) (OECD) (-)  pol 2003  8     
Job availability requirement index (Søren Hasselpflug, "Availability criteria in 
25 countries", Danish Finance Ministry Working Paper n°12/2005) (+)  pol 2004    -2      
Unemployment trap (low wage-earner): Marginal effective tax rate for an 
unemployed person (67% AW, single person) (-)  pol  2001-2007  1/8  5  ↓  -23 
Unemployment trap (average wage-earner): Marginal effective tax rate for 
an unemployed person (100% AW, single person) (-)  pol  2001-2007  1/8  -5  ↓  -14 
Inactivity trap (low wage-earner): Marginal effective tax rate when moving 
from social assistance to work (67% AW, single person) (-)  pol  2001-2007  1/8  17  ↓  -6 
Inactivity trap (average wage-earner): Marginal effective tax rate when 
moving from social assistance to work (100% AW, single person) (-)  pol  2001-2007  1/8  16  ↓  -5 
Net Replacement Rates for unemployed persons (67% AW, single person) 
(-)  pol 2001-2007    2  ↓ -22 
Net Replacement Rates for unemployed persons (100% AW, single person, 
after 7 months) (-)  pol 2001-2007    2  ↓ -23 
Average unemployment benefit replacement rate (%) (OECD) (-)  pol 2003  -2     
Long-term unemployment rate (-)  perf  1999-2007   1/2  -1  ↑  16 
Unemployment rate - 15-64 age group- Pre-primary, primary and lower 
secondary education - levels 0-2 (ISCED 1997) (%) (-)  perf 1999-2007    8  ↑ 9 
Employment rate - 15-64 age group-Pre-primary, primary and lower 
secondary education - levels 0-2 (ISCED 1997) (LFS) (%) (+)  perf 1999-2007    -8  ↑ 2 
Labour reserve (total) EMCO19A9 (-)  perf  2005-2007   1/2  -22  ↓  -20 
Net Replacement Rates for unemployed persons (100% AW, single person, 
after 13 months) (-)  pol 2001-2007    21 =  -12 
Unemployment trap (low wage-earner): Marginal effective tax rate for an 
unemployed person (67% AW, one-earner couple with 2 children) (-)  pol  2001-2007  1/8  14  ↓  -10 
Unemployment trap (average wage-earner): Marginal effective tax rate for 
an unemployed person (100% AW, one-earner couple with 2 children) (-)  pol  2001-2007  1/8  -1  ↓  -12 
Inactivity trap (low wage-earner): Marginal effective tax rate when moving 
from social assistance to work (67% AW, one-earner couple with 2 children) 
(-) 
pol  2001-2007  1/8  22  ↑  -1 
Inactivity trap (average wage-earner): Marginal effective tax rate when 
moving from social assistance to work (100% AW, one-earner couple with 2 
children) (-) 
pol  2001-2007  1/8  20  ↑  -1 
        
Aggregate score (based on the Narrow list)           0     -5 
  





Labour taxation to stimulate labour demand  
   Characteristics of indicator  Results 
  






   Absolute  Relative 
EU15 
Tax rate on low wage earners: Tax wedge on labour 
cost (single earner) (-)  pol  1999-2007   1/4  -2  ↑  14 
Implicit tax rate on employed labour (-)  pol  1999-2006   1/4  -10  ↑  4 
Social security paid by employer as a % of total labour 
costs . Industry and services (excluding public 
administration) (-) 
pol 1999-2006           
Undeclared work (national sources-early 2000s ) (-)  perf 2003    -6      
Unemployment rate - 15-64 age group- Pre-primary, 
primary and lower secondary education - levels 0-2 
(ISCED 1997) (%) (-) 
perf 1999-2007    8  ↑ 9 
Youth unemployment ratio (-)  perf 2000-2007  6  ↑ 19 
Long-term unemployment rate (-)  pol 1999-2007  -1  ↑ 16 
Tax rate on average wage earners: Tax wedge on 
labour cost (single earner) (-)  pol  2001-2007   1/4  -2  ↑  2 
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) Married 
couple with 2 children, 100% and 67% of AW (OECD) (-)  pol  2001-2007   1/4  -1  ↑  10 
  








Job protection and labour market segmentation/dualisation  
   Characteristics of indicator  Results 
  






   Absolute  Relative 
EU15 
Regular EPL (Overall strictness of protection against 
dismissals) (-)  pol  2006     7       
Temporary EPL (Overall strictness of regulation) (-)  pol 2006      -2      
Youth unemployment ratio (-)  perf  2000-2007   1/2  6  ↑  19 
Indicator of fluidity in the labour market : Proportion of the 
Long term unemployed over total unemployment (-)  perf  2000-2007   1/2  -6  ↑  12 
Unemployment rate - 15-64 age group- Pre-primary, 
primary and lower secondary education - levels 0-2 
(ISCED 1997) (%) (-) 
perf 1999-2007      8  ↑ 9 
Share of employees with a contract of limited duration 
(annual average) (-)  perf 1999-2007      2  ↓ -9 
Involuntary temporary employment (who could not find 
permanent job) as % of total employment (LFS) (-)  perf  1999-2007  1      0  ↓  -8 
Involuntary Part-Time employment as % of total 
employment (LFS) (-)  perf  1999-2007  1      -6  ↓  -12 
Transition from fixed-term employment to permanent 
employment (2001) (%) (-)  perf 2001      -4      
In-work-poverty risk (-)  perf  2003-2007  1      -12  ↓  -9 
Undeclared work (national sources-early 2000s ) (-)  perf 2003      -6      
     
Aggregate score (based on the Narrow list)           -5     -3 
 
  




Policies increasing working time 
   Characteristics of indicator  Results 
  






   Absolute  Relative 
EU15 
Low-wage (poverty) trap : disincentives to work longer 
or earn more (One earner couple with two children)   
(EMCO 19M6, STRIND ) 2001-2007 (-)  
pol  2001-2007   1/2  21  ↑  13 
Low-wage trap  : disincentives to work longer or earn 
more (Single person with no children) (EMCO 19M6, 
STRIND) 2001-2007 (-)   
pol  2001-2007     11  ↓  -7 
Low-wage trap for second-earner income (first earner: 
67% APW; second earner: 33% to 67%) (-)  pol 2001-2007    1/2  -10  ↓ -21 
Weekly usual working time (men) (+)  perf 1999-2007  -5  ↑ 10 
Weekly usual working time (women) (+)  perf 1999-2007  -18  ↑ 13 
Annual average working time (+)  perf  2000-2007     10  ↓  3 
Share of overtime workers (men) (+)  perf 2000-2007  -8  ↑ 1 
Share of overtime workers (women) (+)  perf  2000-2007  1      -8  ↑ 5 
Serious accidents at work  (-)  perf 1999-2005  4  ↑ 7 
Fatal accidents at work (-)  perf 1999-2005  11  ↑ 0 
     
Aggregate score (based on the Narrow list)           13     3 
 
  




Specific labour supply measures for women  
   Characteristics of indicator  Results 
  






   Absolute  Relative 
EU15 
Childcare (0-2 years) for less than 30 hours (+)  pol  2004-2006   1/4  -7  ↑  3 
Childcare (0-2 years) for 30 hours and more (+)  pol  2004-2006   1/4  3  =  0 
Childcare (3 years to compulsory school age) for less than 30 
hours (+)  pol 2004-2006      -14  ↓ -1 
Childcare (3 years to compulsory school age) for 30 hours and 
more (+)  pol  2004-2006   1/4  14  ↓  -7 
Childcare (compulsory school age up to 12 years) for less than 
30 hours (+)  pol 2005-2006      -11  ↑ 8 
Childcare (compulsory school age up to 12 years) for 30 hours 
and more (+)  pol  2005-2006   1/4  13  ↓  0 
Number of months of maternity/paternity/parental leave with 
benefits replacing at least 2/3 of salary (+)  pol 2005      4      
Inactivity trap for the second member of a couple (first earner: 
67% APW; second earner: social assistance to 33%) (-)  pol  2001-2007   1/2  1  ↑  1 
Low-wage trap for second-earner income (first earner: 67% 
APW; second earner: 33% to 67%) (-)  pol  2001-2007   1/2  -10  ↓  -21 
Life-long learning. For women  (+)  pol  1999-2007  1      -6  ↑  -7 
Female employment rate (%) (+)  perf  1999-2007   1/3  -18  ↑  4 
Gender pay gap in unadjusted form (-)  perf  1999-2006  1      11       
Gender segregation in occupations (-)  perf 2000-2007      17  ↓ -13 
Gender segregation in sectors (-)  perf 2000-2007      8  ↓ -17 
Unemployment gender gap (-)  perf 2000-2007      -8  ↑ 13 
Employment impact of parenthood for women (-)  perf 2000-2007      9  ↓ -5 
Employment gender gap in full-time equivalent  (-)  perf  2000-2007   1/3  -11  ↑  -7 
Female part-time workers in % of total female employment (+)  perf  1999-2007  1      -8  ↑  15 
Involuntary female part-time employment as a percentage of 
female part-time employment (-)  perf 1999-2007      -14  ↓ -2 
Female Activity rate (15 to 64 years) (Eurostat) 1999-2007 (+)  perf 1999-2007      -20  ↑ -1 
The difference in employment rates between men and women in 
% (-)  perf  2000-2007   1/3  -16  ↑  0 
     
Aggregate score (based on the Narrow list)           -3     -1 
 
  




Specific labour supply measures for older-workers 
   Characteristics of indicator  Results 
  






   Absolute  Relative 
EU15 
Implicit tax on continued work(+)  pol  2006  1      -3       
Coverage of early retirement (-)  pol  1999-2006  1      0  =  10 
Life-long learning: Participation of the population aged 55-64 
in education and training(+)  pol  2000-2007   1/2  -5  ↑  -6 
Life-long learning: Participation of the population aged 45-54 
in education and training (EMCO 23M4)(+)  pol  2000-2007   1/4  -6  ↑  4 
Difference between employment rate of older workers aged 
55 to 64 and total 15-64- Men (+)  perf  1999-2007   1/4  -11  ↑  -11 
Difference between employment rate of older workers aged 
55 to 64 and total 15-64- Women (+)  perf  1999-2007   1/4  -7  ↓  -7 
Average exit age from the labour force- total(+)  perf  2001-2007   1/2  -8  ↑  14 
Activity rate (55 to 64 years) (Eurostat) 1999-2006 (+)  perf 1999-2007    -15  ↑ -9 
Employment rate of older workers aged 55 to 64- Total (+)  perf  1999-2007   1/4  -14  ↑  -10 
     








Wage bargaining and wage-setting policies  
   Characteristics of indicator  Results 
  






   Absolute  Relative 
EU15 
Wage moderation    
Real unit labour cost growth ( %) (-)  perf  2000-2007   1/2  2  ↑  0 
Nominal unit labour cost growth (-)  perf  2000-2007   1/2  3  ↑  5 
Wage differentiation                   
Relative minimum-wage levels (-)  pol  2000-2006       
Full-time employees on the minimum wage - (%) 
(Proportion of full-time employees earning the minimum 
wage)-Eurostat- Earning-Newcronos 1999-2007 (-) 
pol 1999-2007           
Nominal unit wage cost gap between services and 
manufacturing industry (-)  perf 2006    14      
Low-skilled unemployment gap relative to the high-skilled 
unemployment rate (-)  perf  1999-2007   1/2  12  ↑  8 
Dispersion of regional unemployment rates (-)  perf  2000-2007   1/2  -16  ↑  11 
     
Aggregate score (based on the Narrow list)           0     6 
Sub aggregate I           2     2 
Sub aggregate II           -2     10 
  




Immigration and integration policies  
   Characteristics of indicator  Results 
  






   Absolute  Relative 
EU15 
Share of employed foreign-born population over total 
population (+) (OECD-Eurostat-2008)   perf  2005-2006  1      -18  ↑  -8 
Share of foreign population over total population (Citizenship 
criterion) (+)  perf 1999-2007      -7  ↑ 4 
Share of foreign-born population over total population (Birth 
Place criterion) (+)  perf 1999-2007          
Employment rate gap between non EU and EU nationals 
(EMCO 19.M5)(-)  perf  2005-2007   1/2  14  ↓  -14 
Difference between unemployment rates of nationals and non-
EU nationals (-)  perf 2005-2007      9  ↓ -6 
Difference between nationals and non-EU25 nationals 
participation rates(+)  perf 2005-2007      13  ↑ 4 
Difference between foreigners and nationals in the share of 
those with less than upper secondary education(+)  perf 2003          
Employment rate gap between EU born and non-EU born 
(EMCO19.M5) (-)  perf  2005-2007   1/2  14  ↓  -11 
Employment rate of foreign-born (% foreign-born population) 
(OECD, 2008) (+)  perf  2005-2006   1/2  6  ↑  5 
Proportion of foreign-born population with primary education  
(% total foreign-born population) (OECD 2008) (-)  perf  2005   1/4  -8       
Proportion of foreign-born population with tertiary education  
(% total foreign-born population) (OECD 2008) (+)  perf  2005   1/4  -10       
Crude rate of net migration (including corrections)(+)  perf 1999-2007      8  ↑ 14 
Difference between native-borns and foreign-born  of the share 
of those with primary education (-)  perf 2005      10      
     
Aggregate score (based on the Narrow list)           -2     -7 
  




Labour market mismatch and labour mobility 
   Characteristics of indicator  Results 
  






   Absolute  Relative 
EU15 
Change in the sectoral employment shares (Shift-share 
indicator based on 10 sectors: half the sum of the absolute 
changes of the employment shares across all sectors). (+)  
perf  2000-2007  1      -8  ↑  -7 
Mismatch by education (Variance of relative 
unemployment rate by educational attainment - ISCED 
decomposition)(-) 
perf  1999-2007  1      6  ↑  3 
Dispersion of regional employment rates, male 15-64, 
NUTS2 (-)  perf  2000-2007     -20  ↑ -3 
Dispersion of regional employment rates, female 15-64, 
NUTS2 (-)  perf  2000-2007     -23  ↑ 12 
Dispersion of regional (NUTS level 2) unemployment rates 
of age group 15-64 (%) (-)  perf  2000-2007     -16  ↑ 12 
Dispersion of regional (NUTS level 3) unemployment rates 
of age group 15-64 (%) (-)  perf  2000-2007  1      -16  ↑  11 
Vacancies per 1000 unemployed (EMCO 20A2)(-)  perf  2001-2007  1              
Change in sectoral composition of unemployment (shift 
share) between 2007 and 2000 - Men (Eurostat, 3 sectors: 
services, industry and agriculture) 
perf  2007    -5      
Change in sectoral composition of unemployment (shift 
share) between 2007 and 2000 - Women (Eurostat, 3 
sectors services: industry and agriculture) 
perf  2007     12      
     
Aggregate score (based on the Narrow list)           -6     2 
  




Competition policy framework 
   Characteristics of indicator  Results 
  






   Absolute  Relative 
EU15 
Total State aid - as a percentage of GDP (STRIND tsier100) (-)  pol  1999-2006   1/2  7  ↑  6 
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid - as a percentage of GDP 
(STRIND tsier100) (-)  pol  1999-2006   1/2  4  ↑  -2 
Public procurement - Value of public procurement which is 
openly advertised, % GDP (STRIND tsier090) (+)  pol  1999-2006   1/2  -1  ↑  1 
Public procurement - Value of public procurement which is 
openly advertised, as a percentage of total public procurement 
(+) 
pol  1999-2006   1/2  2  ↑  1 
Barriers to competition - Legal barriers (OECD) (-)  pol 2003      -8      
Barriers to competition - antitrust exemptions (OECD) (-)  pol 2003      5      
State control - Involvement in business operation (OECD) (-)  pol 2003      -8      
Regulation impact - average impact of regulation in non-
manufacturing sectors (post and telecom ; energy, finance, 
transport, distribution, business services) on other industries 
(OECD) (-) 
pol 1999-2003      -11      
The competition law and policy indicator - Indicator scale of 0-6 
with 6 designating an overall framework least conducive to 
competition.(OECD: Høj et al., 2007) (-) 
pol 2003      12      
Comparative price levels - comparative price levels of final 
consumption by private households including indirect taxes (EU-
27=100) (STRIND tsier010) corrected for wealth effect (-) 
perf  1999-2007  1      -10       
Average Mark up - Total industry based on Euklems data (DG 
ECFIN) (-)  perf 2004      -21      
        















Sector specific regulation (telecom, energy)       
   Characteristics of indicator  Results 
  







   Abs  Relative 
EU15 
Telecom             
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications - local calls (including 
calls to the Internet) - as a percentage of the total market (STRIND tsier070) (-)  perf 2001-2005     -2       
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications - long distance calls - 
as a percentage of the total market (STRIND tsier070) (-)  perf 2001-2005    -11      
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications - international calls - 
as a percentage of the total market (STRIND tsier070) (-)  perf 2001-2005    4      
Average of the market share of the incumbent in fixed telecom (local, national, 
international) own calculations using STRIND indicators (-)  perf 2001-2005  1      -2       
Market share of the leading operator in mobile telecommunication - as a 
percentage of the total market (STRIND tsier080) (-)  perf 2001-2005  1      -2       
Price of telecommunications - local calls - Price level and evolution in the 
telecommunications market (in Euro per 10 min call) (STRIND tsier030) (-)  perf 1999-2006   1/3  12  ↑  -4 
Price of telecommunications - national calls - Price level and evolution in the 
telecommunications market (in Euro per 10 min call) (STRIND tsier030) (-)  perf 1999-2006   1/3  -17  ↑  -14 
Price of telecommunications - calls to USA - Price level and evolution in the 
telecommunications market (in Euro per 10 min call) (STRIND tsier030) (-)  perf 1999-2006   1/3  -4  ↑  -4 
Energy                   
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market - as a percentage of 
the total generation (STRIND tsier060) (-)  perf 1999-2006  1      4  ↑  15 
Electricity prices - industrial users - Price level and evolution in the electricity 
market (in Euro per kWh) (STRIND tsier040) (-)  perf 1999-2007   1/2  -11  ↓  -9 
Electricity prices - households - Price level and evolution in the electricity market 
(in Euro per kWh) (STRIND tsier040) (-)  perf 1999-2007   1/2  -17  ↓  4 
Gas prices - industrial users - Price level and evolution in the gas market (in Euro 
per Gigajoule) (STRIND tsier050)(-)  perf 1999-2007   1/2  3  ↓  2 
Gas prices - households - Price level and evolution in the gas market (in Euro per 
Gigajoule) (STRIND tsier050)(-)  perf 1999-2007   1/2  3  ↓  9 
Other                   
 Indicator of regulatory conditions in retail distribution - Barriers to entry - (OECD) 
(-)  pol 2003    3      
 Indicator of regulatory conditions in retail distribution - Operational restrictions - 
(OECD) (-)  pol 2003    8      
 Indicator of regulatory conditions in retail distribution - Price controls - (OECD) (-)  pol 2003  -2     
Regulatory conditions in professional services sectors (Accounting, Architect, 
Engineer, Legal) (OECD) (-)   pol 2003    -15      
           
Aggregate score (based on the Narrow list)           -2     3 
Sub aggregate I           -2     -7 
Sub aggregate II           -2     6 
Sub aggregate II                   
  




Market integration - Openness to trade and investment 
   Characteristics of indicator  Results 
  






   Abs  Relative 
EU15 
Barriers to trade and investment indicators - Ownership barriers  
(OECD) (-)  pol 2003      -17 
Barriers to trade and investment indicators - Discriminatory 
procedures  (OECD) (-)  pol 2003      -5 
Barriers to trade and investment indicators - Regulatory barriers 
(OECD) (-)  pol 2003      8 
Barriers to trade and investment indicators - Tariffs (OECD) (-)  pol  2003     0 
 Foreign direct investment restrictiveness indicator - Indicator 
scale of 0-1 from least to most restrictive (OECD) (-)  pol 2006      5 
Number of infringements cases open - Open infringement cases 
for misapplication of Internal Market rules (DG MARKT, IM 
Scoreboard) (-) 
pol 2005-2007      -18  ↑ 13
Average transposition delay in months for overdue directives - 
in months (DG MARKT, IM Scoreboard) (-)  pol 2005-2007      1  ↑ -3
Single market directives - % implemented  (DG MARKT, IM 
Scoreboard) (+)  pol 1999-2007      -3  ↑ 4
Number of 2 years overdue directives (DG MARKT, IM 
Scoreboard) (-)  pol 2002-2007      -7  ↓ -15
Trading Across Borders - Documents for import (number) 
(World Bank Doing Business)  (-)  pol 2005-2008      -2  = -4
Trading Across Borders - Cost to import (US$ per container) 
(World Bank Doing Business)  (-)  pol  2005-2008   1/2  -8  ↓ 10
Trading Across Borders - Time for import (days) (World Bank 
Doing Business)  (-)  pol  2005-2008   1/2  -16  = -6
Protecting Investors - Disclosure Index (World Bank Doing 
Business)  (+)  pol 2005-2008      0  = -2
Protecting Investors - Director Liability Index (World Bank Doing 
Business)  (+)  pol 2005-2008      -3  = -2
Protecting Investors - Shareholder Suits Index (World Bank 
Doing Business)  (+)  pol 2005-2008      3 
Protecting Investors - Investor Protection Index (World Bank 
Doing Business)  (+)  pol 2005-2008      0  = -2
Market integration - trade integration of goods - Average value 
of imports and exports of goods divided by GDP, multiplied by 
100 (STRIND tsier120) (+) 
perf  1999-2007   1/2  6  ↑ 4
Market integration - Trade integration of services - Average 
value of imports and exports of services divided by GDP, 
multiplied by 100 (STRIND tsier120) (+) 
perf  1999-2007   1/2  2  ↑ 0
Market integration - Foreign Direct Investment intensity - 
Average value of inward and outward Foreign Direct Investment 
flows divided by GDP, multiplied by 100 (STRIND tsier130) (+) 
perf  1999-2006  1      0  ↑ 1
Exports of goods and services at 2000 prices - National 
currency; annual percentage change (AMECO) (+)  perf 1999-2008      -18  ↑ 12
Growth of direct investment inward stocks by main origin of 
investment, (million ECU/EUR), partner: All countries of the 
world (Eurostat) (+) 
perf 2000-2006      9  ↑ 9
  
Aggregate score (based on the Narrow list)           -2  2 




Business environment - Regulatory barriers to entrepreneurship 
   Characteristics of indicator  Results 
  







   Absolute  Relative 
EU15 
Registering Property - Procedures (number) (World bank doing 
business) (-)  pol  2004-2008   1/3  -10  =  -2 
Registering Property - Time (days) (World bank doing business) (-)  pol  2004-2008   1/3  4  =  -7 
Registering Property - Cost (% of property value) (World bank doing 
business) (-)  pol  2004-2008   1/3  17  ↑  2 
Paying Taxes - Payments (number) (World bank doing business) (-)  pol 2005-2008      -8  =  -4 
Paying Taxes - Time (hours) (World bank doing business) (-)  pol 2005-2008      -19  ↑ 3 
Paying Taxes -Total tax rate (% profit) (World bank doing business) (-)  pol 2005-2008      -15  ↑ 9 
Dealing with Licenses - Procedures (number) (World bank doing 
business) (-)  pol  2005-2008   1/2  0  =  1 
Dealing with Licenses - Time (days) (World bank doing business) (-)  pol 2005-2008      -14  =  -8 
Dealing with Licenses - Cost (% of income per capita) (World bank 
doing business) (-)  pol  2005-2008   1/2  -19  ↑  9 
Enforcing Contracts - Procedures (number) (World bank doing 
business) (-)  pol  2003-2008   1/3  -17  =  -4 
Enforcing Contracts - Time (days) (World bank doing business) (-)  pol  2003-2008   1/3  -24  ↑  22 
Enforcing Contracts - Cost (% of debt) (World bank doing business) (-)  pol  2003-2008   1/3  -17  =  4 
Regulatory and administrative opacity (OECD) (-)  pol 2003      13     
Regulation impact - average impact of regulation in non-manufacturing 
sectors (post and telecom ; energy, finance, transport, distribution, 
business services) on other industries (OECD) (-) 
pol 1999-2003      -11      
Propensity towards entrepreneurship - Total population considering 
self-employment (in %) (European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer) 
(+) 
perf 2004-2007      16      
Business demography - Survival rate - The percentage of all real 
enterprise births of year n which are still active in year n+2 (STRIND 
er082) (+) 
perf 2000-2006      -2      
           
Aggregate score (based on the Narrow list)           -8     3 
  




Business Dynamics - Start-up conditions 
   Characteristics of indicator  Results 
  






   Absolute  Relative 
EU15 
Starting a Business - Reported time (minimum in days) (DG 
ENTR) (-)  pol  2006-2007  1      4  =  -2 
Starting a Business - Cost (minimum - Eur) (DG ENTR) (-) 
pol 
2006-2007  1      -23  =  2 
Closing a Business Time (years) (World bank doing business) 
(-)  pol 
2003-2008   1/2  -10  ↓  -22 
Closing a Business Cost (% of estate) (World bank doing 
business) (-)  pol 
2003-2008   1/2  -21  ↓  -6 
Closing a Business Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) (World 
bank doing business) (+)  pol 2003-2008      -5  ↑ 20 
Administrative burdens on startups (OECD) (-)  pol  2003     -10    
Business demography - Birth rate - Number of real enterprise 
births of year n, divided by the population of active enterprises 
of year n (STRIND tsier150) (+) 
perf 1999-2005      -12      
Business demography - Death rate - Number of real enterprise 
deaths of year n, divided by the population of active 
enterprises of year n (STRIND tsier150)  (-) 
perf 1999-2005      5      
Prevalence Rates of Entrepreneurial Activity - Early –stage 
Entrepreneurial Activity -(% of adult population between 18-64 
years) GEM (+) 
perf 2007      -1      
                 
Aggregate score (based on the Narrow list)           -11     -5 
  




Financial markets and access to finance 
   Characteristics of indicator  Results 
  






   Absolute  Relative 
EU15 
Competition - efficiency    
Financial market size (ECB, Eurostat) (+)   perf  2007  1      -12       
Value added in the financial sector  (National accounts) (+)  perf 2007    -4      
Stock market liquidity  (Eurostat) (+)  perf  2007  1      11       
Efficiency of the banking system: Cost to income ratio (ECB) 
(-)  perf  2006  1      -4       
Venture capital investments - early stage - relative to GDP, 
breakdown by investment stages (STRIND tsiir080) (+)  perf  1999-2007  1      -12  ↓  2 
Getting Credit - Legal Rights Index (World bank doing 
business) (+)  pol  2004-2008  1      -18  =  -2 
Financial market integration                   
Activity of foreign bank (ECB) (+)  perf  2007  1      -3       
Interest rate spreads: Retail spreads (ECB) (-)  perf  2007  1      3       
Share of foreign listed companies on equity exchanges 
(World Federation of Exchanges) (+)  perf  2007  1      -15       
Financial openness: out and inflowing portfolio capital 
(Eurostat) (+)  perf  2007   1/2  -3       
Financial openness: stock of portfolio investments (IMF) (+)  perf  2006   1/2  -2       
Competition on financial retail markets                   
Market concentration in the banking system: highest 5 (ECB) 
(-)  perf  2007  1      6       
Market concentration in the banking system: Herfindahl 
index (ECB) (-)  perf  2007  1      6       
Tying of retail banking products (DG COMP) (+)  perf 2006    -5      
Access to financial services: density of banks' branch 
network (ECB) (-)  perf  2006  1      6       
Access to financial services: financial inclusion 
(Eurobarameter survey 2008) (-)  perf  2006  1      -16       
Access to financial services: penetration with ATMs (ECB) (-
)  perf  2007  1      -2       
The use of technical advances: cashless transactions (ECB) 
(+)  perf  2006  1      -7       
The use of technical advances: internet banking (Eurostat) 
(+)  perf  2007  1      -11       
           
Aggregate score (based on the Narrow list)           -4     0 
Sub aggregate I           -7     0 
Sub aggregate II           -4       
Sub aggregate II           0        




R&D and Innovation 
   Characteristics of indicator  Results 
  






   Absolute  Relative 
EU15 
Summary Innovation Index (2007 scoreboard) (+)  perf 2002-2006      -12  ↑ 8 
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) - Percentage of 
GDP (STRIND tsiir 020)(+)  perf  1999-2007  1      -13       
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) by source of funds 
- industry - Percentage of GDP (STRIND tsiir030)(+)  perf 1999-2007    -11      
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) by source of funds 
- government - Percentage of GDP (STRIND tsiir030)(+)  pol 1999-2007    -6      
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) by source of funds 
- abroad - Percentage of GDP (STRIND tsiir030) (+)  perf 1999-2007    -9      
Science and technology graduates - total - Tertiary graduates in 
science and technology per 1000 of population aged 20-29 
(STRIND tsiir050)(+) 
perf  1999-2006  1      -10  ↑  9 
Patent applications to the European Patent Office  (EPO) - 
Number of applications per million inhabitants (STRIND 
tsiir060)(+) 
perf  1999-2005  1      -7       
Patents granded by the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) - Number of patents per million inhabitants 
(STRIND tsiir070)(+) 
perf 1999-2002           
Triadic patents - Patents all applied for at the EPO, USPTO and 
JPO - Number of patents per million inhabitants (+)  perf 1999-2005    -9      
Venture capital investments - early stage - Percentage of GDP 
(STRIND tsiir080)(+)  perf 1999-2007    -12  ↓ 2 
High-tech exports - Exports of high technology products as a 
share of total exports (STRIND tsiir 160)(+)  perf 1999-2006    -11  ↓ 2 
Scientific articles per million population (+)  perf 2003  -7     
Employment in High-tech sectors (high-tech manufacturing and 
knowledge-intensive high-technology services - % total 
employment) (+) 
perf  1999-2007  1      -3  ↑  9 
SMEs innovating in-house (% total smes) (Eurostat CIS)(+)  perf 2004    -2      
Innovation expenditures (Eurostat CIS)(+)  perf 2004  -4     
Sales of new -to-market products (Eurostat CIS)(+)  perf 2004    1      
Sales of new -to-firm products (Eurostat CIS)(+)  perf 2004    -8      
     
Aggregate score (based on the Narrow list)           -8     9 
  





   Characteristics of indicator  Results 
  






   Absolute  Relative 
EU15 
ICT expenditure - IT - Expenditure on Information Technology as 
a percentage of GDP(+)  perf  2002-2006   1/2  -13  ↓  3 
ICT expenditure - Telecommunications - Expenditure on 
Telecommunications Technology as a percentage of GDP(+)  perf  2002-2006   1/2  6  ↓  11 
Level of Internet access - households - Percentage of 
households who have Internet access at home (+)  perf 2002-2008    -11  ↑ -15 
E-commerce via Internet - Percentage of enterprises' total 
turnover from e-commerce via Internet(+)  perf 2002-2007    -15  ↑ -12 
E-government on-line availability - Percentage of online 
availability of 20 basic public services(+)  pol  2002-2008   1/2  7  ↑  6 
E-government usage by enterprises - Percentage of enterprises 
which use the Internet for interaction with public authorities(+)  perf  2003-2008   1/2  14  ↑  4 
E-government usage by individuals - total - Percentage of 
individuals aged 16 to 74 using the Internet for interaction with 
public authorities (+) 
perf 2002-2007    -14  ↑ -8 
Broadband penetration rate - Number of broadband lines 
subscribed in percentage of the population(+)  perf  2002-2007  1      -9  ↑  -9 
  
Aggregate score (based on the Narrow list)           -1     1 
  




Education and life-long learning 
   Characteristics of indicator  Results 
  






   Abs  Relative 
EU15 
Education                   
Graduates (ISCED 5-6) aged 20-29 per 1000 of the corresponding age 
population(+)  pol 1999-2006      -3  ↑ 9 
Annual expenditure on public and private educational institutions per student 
compared to GDP per capita, at tertiary level of education (ISCED 5-6), based 
on full-time equivalents(+) 
pol 1999-2005    -17      
Spending on Human Resources - Total public expenditure on education as a 
percentage of GDP(+)  pol 1999-2005    -8      
Youth education attainment level - females - Percentage of the female 
population aged 20 to 24 having completed at least upper secondary 
education(+) 
pol  1999-2007   1/2  3  ↑  15 
Youth education attainment level - males - Percentage of the male population 
aged 20 to 24 having completed at least upper secondary education(+)  pol  1999-2007   1/2  1  ↑  15 
Early school-leavers - females - Percentage of the female population aged 18-
24 with at most lower secondary education and not in further education or 
training(-) 
perf 1999-2007   1/2  -4  ↑  10 
Early school-leavers - males - Percentage of the male population aged 18-24 
with at most lower secondary education and not in further education or 
training(-) 
perf 1999-2007   1/2  -5  ↑  11 
Share of graduates over working age population (15-64) (+)  perf 1999-2006  1      -9  =  0 
Share of tertiary-educated employment over total employment (LFS)(+)  perf 1999-2007  1      -18  ↑  -3 
PISA average score (reading, mathematics and science)(+)  perf 2003; 2006  1      -15  ↓  -2 
Life-Long Learning                   
Life-long learning  - females - Percentage of the female population aged 25-64 
participating in education and training over the four weeks prior to the 
survey(+) 
pol  1999-2007   1/2  -6  ↑  -7 
Life-long learning  - males - Percentage of the male population aged 25-64 
participating in education and training over the four weeks prior to the 
survey(+) 
pol  1999-2007   1/2  -7  =  -10 
LLL 25-34(+)  pol 2000-2007  -6  ↑ -12 
LLL 35-44(+)  pol 2000-2007  -7  ↑ -5 
LLL 45-54(+)  pol 2000-2007  -6  ↑ -5 
LLL 55-64(+)  pol 2000-2007  -5  ↑ -6 
LLL - Low educational attainment (+)  pol 2000-2007  -6  ↓ -8 
LLL - High educational attainment (+)  pol 2000-2007  -4  ↑ 10 
LLL - Medium educational attainment(+)  perf 2000-2007 -3  ↓ -11 
Participation in continuous vocational training (EMCO 23.A2)(+)  perf 1999-2005   1/2  -7       
Investment by enterprises in training of adults - Direct costs and labour costs 
of participants divided by total labour costs (EMCO 23.A1)(+)  perf 1999-2005   1/2  -7       
       
Aggregate score (based on the Narrow list)           -8     2 
Sub aggregate I           -9     4 
Sub aggregate II           -7     -9 
  




Orientation and sustainability of public finances       
   Characteristics of indicator  Results 
  






   Absolute  Relative 
EU15 
Consolidation of public finance                   
General Government Gross Debt (% of GDP) (-)  pol  1999-2007  1      -20  ↑  3 
Distance Structural balance from SGP Medium Term 
Objective(+)  pol 1999-2007      -2  ↑ 13 
Fiscal stance: change in Structural budget balance (AMECO)(+)  pol  2004-2008  1      -1  ↓  -1 
Cyclically Adjusted Balance (AMECO) (+)  perf  1999-2008   1/2  -2  ↓  -1 
Sustainability indicator: S2 component - the initial budgetary 
position (IBP)(-)  perf 2005-2007      1  ↑ 7 
Nominal long-term interest rate (average, AMECO)(-)  perf 1999-2007      -1  ↑ -1 
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-); general government - ESA 
1995 (Percentage of gross domestic product at market prices) 
(+) 
perf 1999-2008      -4  ↓ 0 
Primary budget balance as percentage of GDP (Net lending 
excluding interest, general government - ESA 1995) (+) AMECO  perf  1999-2008   1/2  6  ↓  -2 
Sustainability                   
Sustainability indicator: S2 component - long-term changes in the 
primary balance (LTC) (-)  perf  2005-2007  1      9  ↓  -3 
Projected change in Labour force between 2003 and 2050 
(Budgetary projections: AWG variant scenario  Year: 2005)(+)  perf  2006  1      -11       
Sustainability indicator: S2 (overall) (-)  perf 2005-2007      11  ↑ 6 
Sustainability indicator: S1 (overall)(-)  perf 2005-2007      -1  ↑ 6 
Sustainability indicator: Required Primary Balance (RPB)(-)  perf 2006-2007      4  ↑ 3 
Projected old-age dependency ratio in 2025 = Population aged 
65 and over as a percentage of the population aged 15-64 *) 
(AWG projection) (NOTE: the change is the change in the 
dependency ratio between 2003 to 2025) (-) 
pol 2005-2006      -12  ↓ 0 
              
Aggregate score (based on the Narrow list)           -4     -1 
Sub aggregate I           -6     0 
Sub aggregate II           -1     -3 
 
  




Macroeconomic background information 
   Characteristics of indicator  Results 
  






   Absolute  Relative 
EU15 
HICP (positive difference to the ECB target of 2% means a good 
performance) (+)  pol 1999-2007      4  ↓ 10 
Real Effective Exchange Rate (unit labour costs) (-)  perf 1999-2008    -9  ↓ -13 
Average of absolute value of output  gap 1999-2007 (-)  perf 2007    1      
Real long term interest rate, deflator GDP (AMECO) (-)  perf 1999-2007    -4  ↑ -8 
Business investment - Gross fixed capital formation by the 
private sector as a percentage of GDP (STRIND er070)) (+)  perf 1999-2007    0  ↑ 3 
Trade deficit : Net exports of goods and services at current prices 
(National accounts) in % GDP at market prices.(+)  perf 1999-2008    -1  ↓ -4 
Balance on current transactions with the rest of the world 
(National accounts)  in % GDP at market prices. (+)  perf 1999-2008    -3  ↓ -5 
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